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ABSTRACT

Consciousness and Social Explanation
May 19 80

Joan Elizabeth Cocks, B.A., University of Wisconsin
M.A.

,

University of Wisconsin

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Jean Elshtain
In recent years, positivistic social science has

come under sustained attack.

Almost all of the weaknesses

of which it is accused flow from the fact that positivism

cannot conceptualize matters of human consciousness.

Hence

it has no theoretical access to intersub jective meanings

and rules, individual intentions and beliefs, large-scale

conceptual innovations, the transformations in practice
which accompany them, and troublesome contradictions in the
ways in which human actors understand their own activity.
For critics who believe this flaw to be fatal, the

method of ex-

pressing task becomes the search for

a nev;

ploring and explaining social life.

And in the annals of

social history, there is perhaps no more radical, compre-

hensive and perfected candidate than Hegelian idealism.
Hegel offers both a devastating critique of positive science

V

and a competing theory of scientific explanation, in which

consciousness plays the central role.

He constructs an ac-

count of the individual subject as intentional agent, who

engages in a series of internal relations with the objective world; of social life as expressive of shared norms

and meanings which in turn provide the content of the indi-

vidual's thought; of qualitative transformations which mark

conceptual and practical history; and of

a

fundamental dis-

tinction between the appearance of human action and its
always rational reality.

In his own way, Hegel anticipates

(and in far more systematic form)

many of the principles

of two important contemporary challengers to positivism:

interpretive and critical theory.
Hegel's social theory, however, rests upon the claim
that an objective Reason is the inner substance of all

things and the ultimate subject of all relations.

contemporary thinkers, this claim is unacceptable.

To most
To

Marx, Hegel's eminent successor, it was unacceptable also.

Marx's power as a social theorist stems in part from the
fact that he breaks with idealist ontology.

He locates

thought as an attribute of human beings alone and the content of thought as generated solely from within human

practice.

This done, Marx incorporates the strengths of

Hegelian analysis in his own account of purposive labor,
vi

the social totality, historical transformations, and the

distinction between the appearance of human action and,
for Marx, its less than rational reality.

relation to
gression.

principles

Ilegel

However, Marx's

is not one of simple theoretical pro-

On the one hand, he preserves certain Hegelian

highly problematic for any materialist: the

idea of a teleological history, and the idea (this the

great strength as well as the great weakness of Marx's mature method) of an abstract logic which determines concrete

practice.

On the other hand, he parts company with Hegel

just where he should not.

Hegel appreciates the irreduci-

ble complexity of social life because he sees the special

reason which inheres in each particular kind of practice-from labor to politics to philosophy.

Marx at his worst

explains all forms of practice as disguised expressions of
a

single one.

To do this is not only to miss the points

of most human activities, but also to denigrate the self-

understanding of the actors involved in them.
The search for a method of social explanation, then,

cannot come to an end with either Hegel or Marx.

And it

is not that one simply needs to resolve the tensions in

the latter 's methodological relation to the former.

theorists are committed rationalists.

Both

Their intellectual

and political descendents must decide how far to follow
vii

.

them in their belief that human action can and will become
fully rational, and social life completely transparent to
its participants

viii
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INTRODUCTION

1

Science can be said to be in some sense
for truth.

sense."

a

search

Of course, everything hinges on "in what

Certainly, few contemporary philosophers of

science would agree with Aristotle that the most basic science of all is "theology" or metaphysics
first principles and reasons,"

,

the "theory of

of "being as being."

in-

deed, modern science became modern precisely by detaching

itself from speculative metaphysics, and by restricting
first the search, and then the concept of truth, to the

realm of observable entities.
The fact that science no longer addresses metaphy-

sical issues, however, does not mean that it has left first

principles behind.

Every empirical exploration of things

in the world rests on a prior if tacit understanding of

what constitutes

a

"thing," of what things constitute the

world, and of how the world normally runs.

The many ex-

planatory theories which have come and gone in the past
four centuries have taken with them different notions of

natural order, basic units of analysis, dimensions of variation, and evidential support.^
in turn,

Every explanatory theory,

rests on a more fundamental vision of the rela-

tionship between reality and the mind which seeks to know
it.

Since the 17th century, most scientists have under-

2

.

stood this relationship in very much the same way.

They

have shared the assumption that the real world and the
ideas people have about it are entirely separable.

The

world is simply what it is, and the scientist's task is to
come to grips with it, without the obfuscations of mental

structures, ontologies, or, curiously enough, conceptualizations.
is not.

"Our concepts may be open-textured, but the world
If language is to be descriptive,

it must indi-

cate what there is in the world, no matter how variably we
talk about it."

5

"What there is" on its part are indivi-

dual, physical units,

^

which are either directly observ-

able or can be inferred from observable phenomena.

7

Hence,

although the mind does not participate in the construction
of reality,

it has access to the latter through the process

of sensory investigation.

Lastly, there is a comprehen-

sible order to the world, and this order is a function of

purely external, natural relations which consistently hold

between things of the same sort.

The mind can explain sen-

sible phenomena to the extent that it penetrates the uni-

versal laws which govern them

— laws

for which,

in return,

individual empirical cases provide evidence, but never
proof
If modern science can be said to be,

in this

sense, a search for truth, modern social science has been
social life.
in the same sense a search for the truth of

Mainstream social scientists have discerned
ness between social and natural explanation.

a

close likeThey believe

the social world to be reducible to empirically observ-

able facts or bits of human behavior.

They see sensory

perception as the only legitimate foundation of scientific
knowledge, and conversely, scientific concepts as repli-

cations in thought of sense-data or of that which is in-

ferrable from them.

Finally, they find an order in social

life which derives from regular relations between behavior
and variables external to it.
the discovery of general

lav/s

Their long-range goal is
of human behavior,

g

which

would allow them to explain individual cases in the past
and present, and predict individual cases in the future,

given the occurrence of specified initial conditions.
These laws purportedly do not describe generalizations

which may hold true for limited periods of time, but rather describe regular, unchanging relations between in-

finitely repeatable phenomena.
As much recent literature in philosophy attests,

there are innumerable problems with applying natural science methods to the study of society.

Most fundamentally,

empirical observation cannot grasp the internal meanings

which make

a

particular piece of "behavior" what it is.

actor's
These meanings include, for example, the individual
head an
beliefs and purposes which make the bowing of the

.

5

act of prayer rather than a sign of consent; and the in-

tersubjective rules which assure that
will be either an act of prayer or
not a move of defiance.

a

a

bowing of the head

sign of consent, but

Because the identity of an action

in part depends upon the particular rules, beliefs and

purposes which inform it, the concepts which are to capture action must include

ply to sense-data.

a

reference to ideas and not sim-

And because social life is full of

conflicts in which actors differ over the meaning and identity of their own actions and the actions of others around
them, the concepts with which the scientist describes a

given set of actions will be neutral only in trivial cases.
Most of the time, as, for example, when she must decide

whether the actions she is studying count as an instance
of a riot or a rebellion, the scientist enters into the

same arena in which actors themselves dispute the meaning
of their practices.'''^

The decision she makes will place

her on one side of the dispute rather than the other.
sum,

In

the social theorist must take into her account of ac-

tion the self-interpretations of its participants, and

must describe that action in a way which will implicate
her in their political affairs.

Hence no sharp line can

be drawn between her conceptual activity and the world she

investigates
If action,

secondly, is expressive of rules, be-

liefs and purposes, the scientist cannot look solely to

external causes for its explanation.

A search for univer-

sal causal laws of human behavior is also inapt.

This is

so not only because an explanation of action must make re-

ference to meanings as well as causes, but also because
the meanings which inform action in one social whole are

unlikely to characterize action in another.

The human ca-

pacity for conceptual innovation and imagination means that
even physical movements which look the same in two different cultures or historical epochs, may not be instances of
the same thing.

If the meanings which inform action change

over time and space, one cannot articulate universal laws
of social life.

Finally, empirical science cannot appreciate dis-

tinctions between the appearance and reality of action to

which ambiguities in intentionali ty give rise.

The almost

infinite number of ways in which social rules may be tied
to bodily movements, means that movements which appear to
a

"foreign" observer to be an instance of one kind of ac-

tion may be in reality an instance of another.

The possi-

bility of dissemblance in human affairs, means that an individual actor's behavior nay conceal rather than express
her real beliefs and purposes.

But the most significant

kind of appearance/reality split arises from

a

contradic-

tion between what an actor intends and believes herself to

.

7

be doing, and what she in truth is doing.

If empirical

theory cannot grasp this split because it does not speak
the language of intentionali ty in the first place, the

theorist who only speaks this language cannot grasp it

either

If one looks back over the history of Western

thought, one can find a second kind of search for truth,
v/ith its own

dity.

conception of and claims to scientific vali-

The philosophy of idealism, which places mind at

the center of all explanation, has a long and tenacious

tradition with its roots in ancient Greece.

The classical

Greek idealists believed that thought had at least as objective a reality as matter.

They found the truth of every

particular, sensible thing to be the idea or universal of

which it was either
the immanentists

,

a copy or an embodiment.

According to

this universal determined not only the

identity but the development of each thing, so that causality was not an external relation of one discrete variable to another, but an internal relation of a thing at
some stage in its development to the idea of it as a per-

fected being.
ideas

Because the explanation of things lay in

(whether immanent in or transcendent to them)

,

and

because each species had its own unique idea which made it
selfwhat it was, every level of being was thought to be

8

explanatory and its principle of explanation irreducible
to the principle of any lower level.

The rational hier-

archy of all sensible entities gave to the universe its

natural order.

Greek idealism obviously could not, and

did not, equate scientific knowledge with sense perception.

Some theorists dismissed the evidence of the senses alto-

gether, and purported to re-direct the gaze of the mind
from the imperfections of the phenomenal world to the im-

mutable realm of pure thought.

Others believed that the

scientist must observe sensible phenomena because ideas
did not exist apart from them, but that the true objects
of knowledge still were the ideas and not particular ex-

istents.

If the scientist had to study sensible things in

order to discover the ideas which informed them, he also
had to have prior conceptual knowledge in order to recog-

nize the thing as this kind of thing and not some other.
The Greeks, luckily, had no misgivings about the unlimited

capacities of the human

mind."^"*"

They believed that reason

itself was the unique end of human beings, and (with what

Hegel later called the "characteristic naivete of the ancients")

assumed that this was enough to guarantee them

the ability to fathom the rest of the universe.

It fol-

lows from their notion of the natural end of human life,
by the way, that they would explain action not in terms of

external causes, but in terms of its inner rationality

or lack of it.

Such an explanation at once became an ethi-

cal assessment of the actor.

proper place in

a

To act according to one's

justly ordered community, or to act on

the basis of a true knowledge of things, was to live in

harmony with one's highest nature, and hence to live virtuously and well.

With the rise of Christianity in the Mediterranean
world, this highly intellectualized form of idealism under-

went

a

great change.

Catholic thinkers followed Greek ra-

tionalists in attributing to the sensible world an ideal
truth.

But they found the difference between the world

and its truth to be that not between matter and thought,

but between matter and spirit.

The theological reading of

"Mind" as an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God

made the world newly significant, and human agency and
reason, newly problematic.

God became the original cause

of every level of being, from the purely material to the

purely spiritual.

His divine plan became the final telos

of every particular being and of the universe as a whole,

which consequently had a meaning beyond its physical appearance.''"^

In God's will rested the explanation not only

of every natural event, but of every human action.

same time, humans

(v/ho

At the

experienced the mind/matter dis-

tinction as the troublesome conflict between spirit and
flesh)

bore responsibility for what they did, and their

10

works ultimately were to be judged by an absolute Being

with the power to bestow eternal punishments and rewards.
Consequently, the explanation of action, which for the
Greeks had evoked ethical questions about the actor's

ability to live a life of excellence, raised for Catholics a question with far more serious implications: did

that act manifest goodness or corruption on the part of
its human agent?
the ancients'

Finally, Christian idealism undercut

belief in the innate nobility and power of

the human intellect.

Late medieval theorists, who were of

Aristotelian temper, declared that humans enjoyed
tural reason, and the world

a

natural order.

a na-

Through the

exercise of this reason, humans could abstract from observable phenomena to a knowledge of immutable essences,
and could even gain an imperfect knowledge of God, who was

demonstrated through His creations.

But still, like every-

thing else, the human mind owed its powers to God, and
these powers were subordinate to His powers.

Most impor-

tant, human reason provided no access to the ultimate re-

ality of God and hence of life on earth.

Faith and reve-

lation alone did so.

With the birth of modern science in the 16th and
17th centuries, an elaborate synthesis of Catholic spir-

itualism and Aristotelian rationalism, gave way to
chanical theory of the universe.

a me-

The explanation of all

11

sensible things in terms of

a

hierarchy of natural ideas

and the purpose and will of an interventionist God, was

replaced by an explanation in terms of

a

single set of laws

describing regular relations in time and space between
bodies reducible to physical atoms.

The new mechanistic

cosmology presupposed
the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter,
or material, spread throughout space in a flux
of configurations.
In itself such a material is
senseless, valueless, purposeless.
It just does
what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed
by external relations which do not spring from the
nature of its being. 13

At first, the theory of the material universe as "a perfeet" piece of mechanism"

count of mind and matter.

14

incorporated

a

dualistic ac-

It made mind as Spirit or God

the creator of the laws of motion, and mind as human rea-

son the depository for sensations, ideas, and "everything

refractory to exact mathematical handling."

15

It was the

task of God to turn on the clockwork of the material world.
It was the task of human reason to accumulate knowledge of

that world, calculate its pleasures and its pains, and

serve the human passions instead of restraining them.

The

logic of mechanism, however, could and eventually did lead
to a fully materialist and reductionist vision of reality,

which took material regularities as given, without ascribing them to a spiritual first cause; and which explained

material
the human mind entirely in terms of its simplest

.

12

components
The resurgence of idealism in late 18th and early

19th century Germany, took place against a backdrop of

continuing triumphs in the positive sciences.
hence assumed

a

newly defensive posture.

marked (but utterly without regret)

,

Idealism

As Hegel re-

it no longer was pos-

sible simply to presume an inner reason of all things and
an infinite power of the human intellect.

One instead had

to make two difficult theoretical moves in order to sal-

vage the primacy of mind from the blows already dealt it
by the scientific revolution, and from the threat of new

blows yet to come.

One had to acknowledge and account for

the undeniable advances of positive science, and undermine
the mechanistic premises on which these advances were pre-

dicated.

The Kantian resolution of this dilemma was a re-

latively modest one: it granted to human thought

a

special

dispensation from the nexus of physical causes and effects.
It claimed that the mind was not a passive recipient of

sense-data, but actively participated in the construction
of all experience.

It also reserved a unique status for

actions expressive of moral reason, in a world otherwise

governed by natural laws.

The unfortunate by-product of

this strategy was that it created two schisms in idealist

theory where none had existed before.

The first was be-

tween experience and reality--between the world as the

13

mind ordered it and the world as it "really was," to which
the mind had no access.

ture and reason

— between

The second schism was between na-

action determined by natural de-

sires and causes, and action determined by moral purposes
and ideals.

Partly in response to these problems in Kant-

ian theory, the absolute idealists set out to make a far

more ambitious case on reason's behalf.

They asserted that

subjective reason and objective reality were distinctions

created by and internal to an abstract Ego (Fichte) or

Mind (Hegel).

The findings of empirical science were le-

gitimate but partial truths, which pertained to the subject's experience of the object as alien to itself.

understanding of the world as

a

The

purely physical one go-

verned by natural impulses and material forces, was symptomatic of a reason not yet conscious of nature and objectivity as its own

"

self -distinctions

,

"

ruled by its own

logic.

While Hegel was not the first of the absolute
idealists, he was by far the most presumptuous.

His was a

grand attempt to prove on strict logical grounds that nature, history, and the subject/object distinction were

manifestations of

a self -devloping Reason.

in the end was a failure.

This attempt

But the analytic complexity

which the onslaughts of modern science forced upon him,
and his remarkable breadth of vision, make Hegel provoca-

14

tive

— not

ists.

to say seductive-- for contemporary social theor-

He offers,

first of all, a richly textured portrait

of the human subject.

He sees the layers of the inner

self as deposits of the various relations the subject has
to the objective world.

Each of these relations is in-

herently purposive and cannot be reduced to simple physical terms.

Second, Hegel constructs an interpretive and

wholistic account of social life.

He explains every cul-

ture with reference to a unique rationality or "spirit,"

which provides the inner thread and outer coherence of its
economic, religious, political and intellectual practices.
Third, he develops a method which enables him at once to

respect and comprehend the qualitative transformations of

which history is made.

Finally, Hegel penetrates beneath

the particular intentions and meanings which inform human

action, to a reality of which actors are unaware.
the reality of a universal Reason.

This is

Hegel's reference to it

allows him to escape the hermeneutical circle which every

culture creates for itself, and the limitations adhering
to every particular mode of thought and practice.
It is precisely the idea of an objective Reason

which Marx rejects when he conducts his own social investigations.

His repudiation of absolute idealism has im-

way
mense consequences for his social theory, in the same
had imthat the repudiation of Aristotelian metaphysics

15

mense consequences for the post-medieval understanding of
the natural world.

Nevertheless, Marx draws not on posi-

tivistic science but on Hegel, in order to analyze history,

social life, and capital.

Does he, then, succeed in

devising a non-idealist method wich yet preserves the
strengths of Hegelian inquiry?

Certainly Marx does recon-

struct in accordance with materialist premises, Hegel's

notion of the subject as constituted by its purposive relations to the world; of an inner thread which binds economic, religious, political and intellectual practices into
a coherent whole;

of the transformative nature of society;

and of the distinction between action as it appears to its

human authors, and

a

hidden reality of action.

With his

new theoretical vision, Marx makes a set of discoveries deThere are,

nied him by either idealism or empiricism.

however, several curious aspects of Marx's relation to
Hegel.

First, he fails to make as decisive a break with

absolute idealism as he believes himself to be making.
speaking of history as if it moves through

a

In

series of ne-

gations towards a final, rational climax, he unwittingly

suggests that abstractions have ends of their own.

And

when he argues in his most powerful work, that an objective
logic determines the course of the capital-wage labor relation, he comes very close to explaining concrete social

life in terms of an abstract Idea.

Second, Marx chooses

—

16

to part company with Hegel at an unfortunate point.

Like

the idealist philosopher, he attaches great significance

and promise to human consciousness.

Yet he gives only a

truncated, ambiguous account of it, and at times he seems
to deny that humans are able to have even some grasp of

what they are doing.

Here he would have done better to

learn from Hegel, who always appreciates the rationality

however partial and contradictory--in every mode of human
thought and practice.

When all is said and done, absolute idealism is
spun out of the stuff of fantasy, and Marx's materialism
is not.

With this point in his favor, it is Marx and not

Hegel who bequeaths to us the more compelling (although

hardly unproblematic) explanation of social life.

modern theorists in search of

a

method will find

Still,
a

study o

the two men more illuminating than a study of the one.

This is true both because Hegel's influence on Marx is

profound, and because in a critical sense it is not profound enough.

.

.
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the idea of universality, which the more individualistic
"person," and the more biological "human" do not quite
In my use of impersonal nouns, adjectives and
capture.
I
pronouns, I have followed the following rule of thumb.
discuss
I
theorist
the
have used the masculine forms when
does so, for these theorists not only might have meant the
philosophical "man" to mean only men, but often explicitly
developed a dual theory of human nature along sexual lines.
In all other cases I have tried to substitute neutral terms
like "subject" and "human being" for "man." When necesObsary I have used the feminine adjective and pronoun.
theofor
viously a new, non-sexist vocabulary is required
I apologize for the awkwardness of my inretical work.
terim solution.
"'^The
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Although Aristotle, for one, did not believe all
human beings to be fully rational. There are those who do
not realize their full rational capacities, and those who
do not have full rational capacities to realize.
To explain the actions of the former group, Aristotle points
to habit.
To explain the actions of the latter group, he
points to nature.
See Jean Elshtain, "Moral Woman and
Immoral Man," in Politics and Society Fall, 1974.
,

12

This was at least as true for the common people
as it was for philosophers.
As Marc Bloch describes the
popular mentality of the feudal period, "In the eyes of
all who were capable of reflection the material world was
scarcely more than a sort of mask, behind which took place
all the really important things; it seemed to them also a
language, intended to express by signs a more profound
reality.
Since a tissue of appearances can offer but little interest in itself, the result of this view was that
observation was generally neglected in favour of interpretation." Marc Bloch, Feudal Society Vol. 1 (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), p. 83.
,

""""^Alfred

''"^Herbert

ence

1300-1800

,

1

s

North Whitehead, p. 17.

Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Sci (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 84.

Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.,

of Modern Science
1972)
p. 318.
,
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HEGEL

A great distance separates Absolute Idealism from

analytic philosophy, although it is

a

distance foreshort-

ened by the common heritage of Hume and Kant.

simply dismiss Hegel, whose metaphysic seems
tasy

— hard

Positivists
a

stranga fan-

to swallow even if it could be taken as mere

theology, which it cannot.

Recently, however, certain

ordinary language theorists have resuscitated Hegel but

without his metaphysic, for in other ways they found his
work highly compatible with their own.

Precisely because

of the real bonds they share with him, it is imperative to

keep sight of where these bonds do not extend.

Quite in

contrast to contemporary interpretive theory, Hegel stepped
through a critique of empiricism and its Kantian rejoinder,
to a conception of the world in which the explanation of

the meanings and beliefs which characterize a particular

form of social life, lies in the activity of

a

Universal

Reason.

Perhaps nothing symbolizes the difference between
Hegel and analytic theorists in general, as nicely as their

disparate use of language.

Hegel brought a tradition of

intellectual obscurantism to its finest if not its last
hour.

Is this obscurantism necessary to his argument, and

must one replicate it if one wants to do that argument jus21

.
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tice?

It is fairly obvious,

first of all, that Hegel could

have avoided many of his forays into verbal darkness; and

second that these forays tend to make

a

mystery of the di-

alectical transitions which must sustain his system as a
whole.

But the theory of Absolute Idealism does require a

very abstract discourse, for its central point is that the

truth of concrete, phenomenal things lies in the universal
ideas they express, while the familiar, down-to-earth details of their transient existence, the philosopher can
and must ignore.

Except with regard to his prose, reading Hegel is
like visiting a hall of mirrors, where each surface reveals
the entire room.

The reflection of the whole in the parts

is indeed one of the choicest points of the dialectical

method and prohibits a merely piecemeal discussion of
Hegel's work.

While respecting, as one must do, the inter-

nal relations he posits between reason, the physical world,
and social life,

I

will avoid taking another of those in-

valuable but essentially return journeys through the Phenomenology, Logic, Philosophies of Nature and Spirit.
stead,

I

In-

wish to clarify a limited number of issues bear-

ing on the question of what constitutes a science of so-

ciety: specifically, Hegel's conception of the human subject, his theory of knowledge, and his method of scientific

explanation

CHAPTERI
THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT

Hegel is perhaps the greatest of all rationalists.
He finds human reason fully adequate to the task of com-

prehending reality.

He also believes that social rela-

tions and institutions embody the reason inherent in a par-

ticular form of life.

Many other social theorists, of

course, share one or the other of these beliefs with him.

More singularly, he asserts that a reason ontologically

prior to human consciousness and its social world, is the
inner substance and determinant of all things.

A univer-

sal reason constitutes those natural objects which appear
to be purely material.

It expresses itself in those ac-

tions of human subjects which appear to be a function of

external causes, irrational passions, or solely individual
intentions and purposes.

Lastly, it determines the course

of what appears to be an indifferent historical process,
in which nations and peoples develop and decay.

It is

Hegel's purpose in all his theoretical labors, including
his theory of society, to show how that which confronts the

thinking subject as the most intractably alien object, is
in truth a manifestation of thought, so that the apparently constricting,

external relations in which the subject
23
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finds itself, are internal relations in which it is really
"at home."-'-

However, Hegel could not, after Hume, assert with
the naive assurance of the Greeks,

ner substance of things.

that thought is the in-

Neither could he assume, after

Kant, that the human mind can know this to be the case.
He had to argue these points, and argue conclusively,

which, since he could not rest his case on the evidence of
the senses, meant that he had to argue deductively.

Fur-

ther, he had to argue consistently, deriving matter from

thought instead of leaving a material substratum unexplained.

Hegel's solution to the problem of post-Kantian

idealism was elegant if not unmarred.

By means of a pe-

culiar kind of deduction he called the dialectic, he drew
out of the necessary but most innocuous, empty, and seem-

ingly formal category of human thought, "Being,"

a

series

of more and more elaborated or "concrete" categories, each
of which encompassed but surpassed its predecessors in its

richness and capacity to enfold the content of thought.
Thus Hegel claimed to give logical necessity to the cate-

gories of pure reason which in Kantian philosophy had only
a

pragmatic rationale.

the categories

— or,

But second, Hegel's deduction of

as he saw it,

their self-deduction

("These thought types must be deduced out of Thought it-

self

...

we have merely to let the thought-forms follow
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the impulse of their own organic life"^)

beyond

— carried

itself

purely formal constructs of the subjective mind to

be applied to an externally given content,

to categories

which progressively implied the determination of their own
content.

In other words,

these were categories of reason

the meaning of which entailed thought's giving itself its

determinations rather than being dependent for its content
upon non-thought.

Their advent signified the conversion

of reason to Reason, the transformation of mere thought-

form into
a

f orm-creating-content

.

The implications of such

transformation were as radical as the explanation and

disintegration of the subject-object dichotomy which had
plagued philosophy since Descartes, and as heady as the
assurance of the fundamental freedom of subjectivity, which
had been in peril since Newton.

That self -ob jecti f ying

Reason was the logical telos of the subjective categories,
moreover, implied the inherent capability of the human mind
to grasp the real nature of the objective world.

For the

categories, which led of their own accord to the self-

determining Idea, "are nothing but our own thought and its
familiar forms or terms: and these are the

everything else."

ABC.

.

.of

3

It is vital to understand precisely what Hegel

means by "Abstract Thought," because he will claim this

Thought to be the inner logic of every concrete thing, in-
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eluding the things of the social world, and of almost all
relations between things, including social relations.

He-

gel describes Abstract Thought (which he also calls the

"Concept," "Idea," "Notion," and "Reason") as an "immediate" or undifferentiated conceptual whole, which proceeds
to create all of its distinctions or content out of itself.

These distinctions are the formal categories of thought
such as "Being" and "Nothing," "Identity" and "Difference,"
"Form" and "Content," "Cause" and "Effect," and most cri-

tically,

"Subject" and "Object."

Because Thought is self-

determining, the process by which it creates its own content cannot be accidental, instinctual, or the effect of a

material cause.
cess,

It rather must be a

"

self -deductive " pro-

in which each necessary category of Thought gives way

through internal contradiction to an equally necessary,
but more elaborated or "concrete" category.

Through this

self-deduction of the categories, what was merely implicit
in the nature of Reason becomes explicit.

Because its de-

velopment is determined by its unfolding inner nature and
not by a contingent, external cause, Hegel equates the

Idea with both necessity and freedom.

never comes up against

a

Because the Idea

barrier dividing it from a re-

ality independent of it, Hegel calls it "Infinite Thought."
no
One important consequence of the fact that Thought has
its own
limits, is that it steps beyond the production of
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content, to produce the thought of this content as its own

creation.

That is, the Idea not only "separates itself

from itself" by elaborating its own distinctions, but it

returns to itself as the self -concious unity of "identity
and difference," "thought and content," "subject and ob-

ject."

This return is implicit in the entire elaboration

of the categories leading up to it.

It occurs as the con-

tradictions internal to each category force Thought to posit more and more comprehensive categories, which come

closer and closer to articulating the system of Thought as
a self -reflective whole.

There is, however, one final dis-

tinction which Abstract Thought makes: that betv/een Thought
as a purely formal,

conceptual whole (including the con-

ceptual distinction between form and content, subject and
and the actual objective world as its concrete con-

object)
tent.

This juncture bears the entire weight of Hegel's

derivation of the concrete world from Abstract Thought.
He argues that the very distinction between Thought as a

conceptual whole and objectivity entails that the object
become actual.

His reason:

if the object did not become ac-

tual, it would remain mere concept, and the distinction be-

tween Concept and objectivity would have yet to be made.
is here,

then, that the Idea "breaks through its own bar-

riers and opens out into objectivity,"

4

and Hegel moves

from an account of the Abstract Logic to an account of nature and human civilization.

It
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By the end of his discussion of the Abstract Idea,

Hegel has established certain explanatory principles which

will govern his study of social life.

The most obvious

principle is that phenomenal reality--physical nature, human subjects, and social institutions

which the Notion lies concealed."

— is

"covering under

a

The concrete world is

Reason in objective form, and hence the purpose of Hegel's
social investigations will be "to apprehend in the show of
the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent

and the eternal which is present."^

He will discover in

the objects of both Nature and Society

(which he calls

"Mind" or "Spirit"), specific natural and spiritual ideas,

and he v/ill explain nature and society in terms of them.

These ideas, and the actual objects in which they manifest
themselves, comprise the objective content or distinctions
of Abstract Thought.
the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy
of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an applied Logic, and that Logic is the soul which
Their problem in that case is
animates them both.
only to recognize the logical forms under the
shapes they assume in Nature and Mind shapes
which are only a particular mode of expression
for the forms of pure thought.
.

.

.

—

One must note that the relation of natural ideas to na-

tural objects is not symmetrical with the relation of

spiritual ideas to concrete social life.

Ideas of nature

are immanent in sensuous natural objects, but these ob-
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jects do not "have" their ideas in the sense of being con-

scious of them.

The idea of an oak, to use an old example,

develops from "implicit inwardness" to explicit actuality
as the acorn grows into the tree, but the oak never knows

itself or, for that matter, any thing else.

For this rea-

son Hegel calls sensuous nature "Mind asleep."

Ideas of

spirit, on the other hand, are immanent in the thought and

thought-permeated practices of conscious, self -reflective
human beings.

The idea of freedom, for example, becomes

actual only when human beings become fully conscious of it
and embody it in their practice.

But although the ideas

of spirit have no actuality outside human thought and prac-

tice,

these ideas still are expressions of Universal Rea-

son rather than simply the peculiar, imaginative inventions
of individual persons or cultures.

It follows,

rather

oddly, that the particular content of a spiritual idea (the

distinction of the concept of Right, for example, into Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life) is determined by

neither the empirical content of human practice nor the
analytic vagaries of the philosopher.

The concept develops

its distinctions out of itself and expresses itself in,

rather than corresponds to or arises out of,

a

given em-

pirical and interpretive social reality.
Hegel's second explanatory principle, it that the

concrete world is hierarchically ordered according to the
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extent to v;hich each level of existence is able to think
and reflect on itself.

Spirit is of

a

The realm of human civilization or

higher order than that of pure material na-

ture, because human subjects have the capacity for con-

sciousness and self-consciousness.

Hegel's understanding

of self -consciousness is highly complex, because he sees

the self as something not separate from, but rather inclu-

sive of, its objective relations.

Thus when he asks. To

what extent does the subject have a knowledge of itself?
he asks it in this form:

How does the subject understand

itself in its relation to the object or "other," and how
does the subject attempt to overcome the separation between
this other and itself?

Hegel will show the subject to be

multi-layered, in that it is engaged with the object as
raw nature, as a second subject, as

a

labored product, as

the spiritual world, and finally as a concept in thought.
He will argue that each of these engagements arises logi-

cally (not temporally) out of a lower mode, each undergoes
its own development over historical time, and each embodies
a

greater unity of subject and object than the relations

below it.

These ontological relations, which determine

the being of the subject, are at the same time epistemo-

logical relations, for two reasons.

First, each way in

which the subject interacts with the object is

a

means to

self-consciousness, for all aabject/object relations are

attempts to wrench from the other an expression and
ledge of the self.

know-

a

Second, the highest subject/object re-

lation, which enfolds the rest, is the epis temological re-

lation itself.

Here the activity of mind transmutes the

external world, and all other relations with it, into
set of ideas.

a

In the internality of philosophical thought,

where the object appears as pure concept stripped of its

phenomenal covering, one "meets

o

v/ith

oneself."

The com-

plete identity of subject and object, and conversely the
utter freedom of the former from the limitations of the
latter which philosophical thought entails, is the telos
of human subjectivity.

For "It is the urge, the impulse

of spiritual life in itself, to break through the hull of

nature, of sensuousness

,

of its own self -alienation

to attain the light of consciousness, namely,

self."^

and

,

its own

It also is the ultimate stage of the Idea,

for

the human subject who thinks philosophically, embodies the

Idea as the self-conscious unity of subject and object.
One must not under-estimate the significance of the

third principle of social explanation: that necessity governs the movement of social life.

This follows from the

twin claims that Abstract Thought develops its content in
a

thoroughly necessary way, and that the concrete world is

the expression of this development.

Thus, when Hegel ex-

sequence of
amines the transience of nations, the confusing
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artistic genres or religious movements, actions which seem
to be purely impulsive or simply brutal, he will do so in

order to show
Reason.

they manifest the necessary workings of

He makes one concession to irrationality: he ad-

mits that
fairs.

hov/

a

small element of chance enters into human af-

But since chance is, by definition, meaningless,

it plays no part in an explanation of the reason why

things occur as they do.

Ironically, Hegel insists that

what happens in the realm of spirit happens of necessity,
in order to protect the freedom of the subject.

He be-

lieves that to act according to whim, instinct, idiosyn-

cratic intention, or in response to the stimulus of an external force, is to be determined by something other than

reason and hence to be unfree.

For Hegel, only rational

action is self-determined action, aid reason

— determined

its own inner nature--cannot be other than it is.

by

In his

stress on the necessity which governs human action, Hegel
shows a limited sympathy with positivistic science, which
aims to reveal the explanatory laws beneath the complex

texture of social practice.

But Hegel believes that the

positivists err profoundly when they articulate these laws
as blind and contingent relations between external causes

and effects, instead of as logically necessary relations

grounded in the inner reason of all things.
pecially)

Even (or es-

the gap between the non-rational appearance of
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social life and its rational reality, is not fortuitous,
but is a necessary stage in the odyssey of the Idea.
"Man alone has
thinks.""'"^

f reedom---and

only because he

At his beginnings, however--and by "beginnings"

Hegel means both the earliest point in historical time and
the most primitive level of subjective experience

only potentially free.

— he

is

In fact he lives at the mercy of

forces beyond his control.

He is hedged in by natural in-

stinct on the one side and natural obstruction on the
other.

He acts out of sensual impulse and brute emotion.

The fundamental task he must undertake in order to realize
his freedom is this: he must transform his natural desires

and the natural objects around him into aims and objects of
his own making.

Hegel insists against liberal theorists,

that this transformation cannot occur outside of social
life.

He insists against conservatives, that the replace-

ment of natural by social relations marks the demise of
instinctual behavior and the eventual triumph of rational
action.

Through the reciprocal satisfaction of natural

needs, humans develop new, specifically social needs which

combine natural with "mental needs arising from ideas.
These "mental needs"--for recognition, autonomy, community,
justice, knowledge, and freedom itself

— bear

the promise

of the subject's liberation from the confines of physical

nature.

They will issue in the elaboration of

a

second

34

level of existence: an inter-subjective, thought-

constituted or "spiritual" realm of language, custom, moral rules,

laws, norms of beauty, religious practices, and

modes of knowledge, which both nourish and reflect in objective form the subject's developing reason.

Free Mind consists precisely in its being no
longer implicit or as concept alone, but in its
transcending
its immediate natural existence, until the existence which it gives to itself is one which is solely its own and free.-^^
.

.

.

The most rudimentary engagement of the human sub-

ject with the object, however, is that between human being
as desirous animal and natural world as pure,

"other."

sensuous

Here the subject experiences the object as en-

tirely external and alien to him.

He can free himself

from this object only by destroying it.

Driven by instinc-

tual desire, the subject consumes the natural object and
so dissolves the self/other distinction.

Such is the

idealist's interpretation of natural appetite!

The gra-

tification of brute desire, hov/ever, is a poor means to a
freedom of the self from the other, because it presupposes
the independence of the object.

It also is a poor means

to a knowledge of the self in the other, because it anni-

hilates the other altogether.

Finally, it bespeaks an im-

poverished subject, beacuse it does not require the mediawith the
tion of reason and is the one mode of engagement

world that the human being shares with other animals.

In
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sum,

the relation of Desire does not express the ration-

ality of the subject, negates the identity of subject and
object, and fails to preserve the difference between subject and object within a "self-identical whole."
It is in its relation to a second subject that the

subject finds its first real identity with the object and
the sustenance for all subsequent identities.
is part of the objective world,

but it too has conscious-

ness and sees the self as its other.
a

Another self

In its contact with

second self, the subject becomes self-conscious for the

first time, for this particular object reflects its own

inner life and capacity for thought.
A self-consciousness has before it a selfOnly so and only then is^ it
consciousness.
self -consciousness in actual fact; for here
first of all it comes to have the unity of itWhen a selfself in its otherness.
consciousness is the object, the object is just
as much ego as object. ^-^
.

.

.

The subject secures its freedom in this second relation by

recognizing the object as

a

subject and by gaining the se-

cond subject's recognition of itself as

a

subject.

Both

subjects set free each other's capacity for thought and

self-consciousness, and validate each other as selfconscious beings.
selves,

Furthermore, in the meeting of two

"we already have before us the notion of Mind or

Spirit."''"'^

The identity of subjects becomes the basis for

will mediate
the intersubjective world, which henceforth
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all subject/object relations,

including those of Desire.

Hegel stresses that Recognition must be a relation of
equality.

If the subject simply destroys the other self

in order to obtain freedom from it,

it loses its knowledge

of itself in the other and the other's acknowledgement of

itself as subject.

If it does not destroy the second self

but treats it oppressively, as less than an identical subject,

it will not see its own,

free self when it looks in-

to the mirror of the other but instead a self "in the form

and shape of thinghood." 15

Likewise, the recognition which

a less-than-f ull subject affords is inadequate,

is recognition by a lower and alien being.

because it

The subject is

as little confirmed in its relation to a lesser self, as

the latter is.

As we shall see, Hegel does view the in-

equality of subjects as vital to the third subject/object
relation.

In the relation of self to self, however, only

equality assures identity and hence freedom.

One should

note that the necessary equality of subjects has ontolo-

gical rather than socio-political significance.
not preclude

— and

It does

in fact Hegel believes that the Idea

demands--status distinctions among social beings.

"""^

We have seen that the human animal overcomes raw

nature by consuming it.

But Desire is not the whole truth

of the relation of subject to matter; neither subject nor

object remain forever in

a

purely natural state.

We also

7

8
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have seen that the subject realizes its identity with other

subjects through relations of mutual recognition.

The

subject wins such recognition, however, only at the end of
a

struggle with the other self as alien object.

During

this struggle, one self succeeds for a time in dominating
the other.

This phase of "lordship and bondage"

— metaphor

for the emergence of psychological discipline within the

self as well as of social discipline v;ithout 1 --initiates
the third, critical relation of subject to object: that of

Labor.

Forced to labor on raw nature in order to satisfy

his master's desires, the bondsman transforms nature from

raw matter into artifact and himself from desirous animal

into purposive agent.

The satisfaction of brute desire

through immediate consumption leaves no traces in the
But when the

world, because desire "lacks objectivity."

subject labors, he "releases history from nature."

1

For

labor
Labour
is desire restrained and checked.
renegative
shapes and fashions the thing. The
the
of
form
lation to the object passes into the
reand
object, into something that is permanent
.

mains

.

.

.

.

.-'-^

Through labor, the subject molds nature in accordance with
his purposes and ideas, so that it comes to reflect his

thought.

He thus objectifies himself in the world, comes

to know himself in the world, and is at home with the

world as his own expression.
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Nonetheless, the labored object still has an inde-

pendent and external existence of its own--that recalcitrant "otherness" of all physical things.

subject/object relation is

a

The fourth

more fully internal one.

This

is the relation of the individual subject to the "spiritual

world," which Heqel also calls "civilization," "culture,"
"nation," and the "system of right."

The spiritual world

consists of the social relations in which the individual

subject is embedded, and the customs, moral norms, laws and

institutions which give these relations their specific content.

It provides the context for all lesser relations of

Desire, Recognition, and Labor, and because it is the

source of the language in which the subject thinks, it mediates the highest subject/object relation as well.

This

spiritual world the subject experiences first as a natural,
given way of life, and he identifies himself with its social bonds intuitively and unref lectively

experiences it as

a

.

He secondly

set of external relations, between

autonomous individuals, which are separate from him and

which are simply instrumental to his private needs and
wants.

Third and finally, he comes to know and identify

himself with the spiritual world as both the source and objective reflection of his own rational thought and will.
Hegel articulates these three moments historically as the

ancient Greek city-state, the liberal order and

and what
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he calls "Ethical Life."
as the family,

He articulates them structurally

the economy or Civil Society, and the State.

The fully developed State provides the subject v;ith his

identity as a member of a social community, but of

a

com-

munity founded on reason, not sentiment or unthinking habit.

Its objective norms, rules and institutions are at

once the inner fabric of his ideas, desires and will,

which consequently
are interwoven with the general and essential considerations of law, the good, duty, etc. For mere
desire, volition in its raw and savege form, falls
outside the scene and sphere of world history.
These general considerations, which at the same
time form norms for directing purposes and actions,
have a definite content
what special course
of action is good or not, right or wrong, is determined, for the ordinary circumstances of ^private
life, by the laws and customs of the State.
.

.

.

Because the State gives his reason its particular content,

what the individual subject wishes to do does not conflict
with those actions which the system of right assigns to
him.

Thus when he acts in accordance with his own will,

he acts in accordance with "a set of objective laws and
.1

institutions that are rational and universal in nature."
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Conversely, when he follows the laws of the State, he follows only his mature, rational volition.

His identity with

the State means that he is at home in his relations with

his fellow citizens, for the State provides them all with
a

common moral substance and in turn expresses the "holy

bond" between them--their common thought or spirit.
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However, the State does not simply nourish and ob-

jectify the particular reason or "national spirit" of its
citizens.

It also objectifies Universal Reason as the lat-

ter develops itself in history.

Thus the customs, rules

and institutions of any particular social order have a re-

ference and significance outside of it, and some nations
will embody self-developinq Reason more adequately than
others.

But since Reason elaborates and expresses itself

exactly through concrete particulars,

one can discover

the standard of universal rationality only by looking with in a particular mode of life.

More precisely, one must

look v/ithin an old and dying mode of life, as a vital cul-

ture still v/ill be in the process of creating both the

norms and institutions to be judged and the standard of
judgement.

Hegel is as contemptuous of the idea of a con-

tent of reason in abstraction from a particular mode of
life, as he is of the idea that each particular mode of

life creates its own idiosyncratic standard of rationality.
He instead believes that the social theorist must be cog-

nizant of three layers of the cultural/moral universe.

He

must penetrate the individual subject's ideas, values and
volition.

He must understand the particular social whole

which nourishes these ideas and expresses them in objective form

— and

each social whole will have its own char-

acteristic spirit, ideas, and institutions of justice and

.
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right.

Finally, he must uncover the immanent principles

of universal Reason, which realize themselves over time in

the spirit and actual practices of particular nations.

In

sum, while Hegel always locates right within a particular

culture, and declares that the subject can know right only
as it is expressed variously in concrete thought and ac-

tion, he grounds the standard of right in universal prin-

ciples of reason and not in subjective opinion or the moral habits of individual cultures.

His ethical theory, in

consequence, is anti-relativist, anti-sub jectivist

,

and

anti-intui tionist
It is important to note that Hegel's theory of

the State is entirely dependent for its support upon his

metaphysic.

The organic connections he posits between

citizen and social whole have curious resonances with
both Burkeian conservatism and Rousseauian rationalism,
but Hegel roots these connections neither in the sanctity of a common tradition nor in the legitimizing power

of participatory democracy.

Instead, he rests the idea

of a harmonious identity of subject and social whole

on the twin claims that the idea of the State is reason

and hence freedom, and that the actual State realizes
its idea over historical time.

He however offers no

substantive test independent of the self-image of any

particular social whole, of the rationality of its laws,
mores and institutions.

In fact, he cannot offer such a
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test.

Logically, he cannot, because he argues that the

content of rationality is furnished within the particular
social order itself.

viability of such

a

Tactically, he cannot, because the
test would entail the possibility of

no state's passing it, of there being no state which is,
in the always unique terms of its own historical epoch,

the actualization of the true or ideal State.

And with

this possibility would re-emerge the old Kantian dichotomy

between the ideal and the real world which Hegel had gone
to such lengths to overcome.

Hegel, or rather "the concept

itself" does offer a formal test of the rational State: it

must be a unity of unity and difference.

But this test is

unconvincing because it is thoroughly elastic.

Hegel's

Prussian passed, and by coming up with different versions
of unity and difference, liberal and fascist states alike

can boast of embodying reason and, as is the more usual
claim, freedom.

Consequently, to accept Hegel's vision of

the State as implicitly and more and more actually rational, we either simply must take his word for it, or embrace

his idealism in toto, within which system the State as

concrete Reason makes as good sense as any other part.

Whether he is persuasive or not about the rationality of the State, Hegel claims that in it the subject

achieves his most complete unity thus far with the objective world.

He also achieves his most perfect freedom from
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alien objectivity, for here his will "is related to nothing

except itself and so is released from every tie of dependence on anything else." 2 2

The relation of self to ra-

tional social whole is such an intimate one, that it al-

most is misleading to say that this whole is an object

opposed to the subject at all.
latent tension between the two.
a

Yet there is at least a
In part,

the tension is

spatial one, for the customs, laws, institutions and

practices of the State extend far beyond the boundaries of
the individual self.

But the tension is also substantive:

it always is possible that the individual's beliefs, values

and purposes will come into conflict with the reason of
the established order.

The latter contradiction between

State and individual in fact is a crucial symptom of the

decay of one mode of social life and the emergence of an-

other

.

CHAPTER

II

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The relations of subject to raw nature, a second

subject, the labored product, and spirit, are progres-

sively internal relations of the self to its own reflection.

Even the spiritual v/orld, however, still has an

existence separate from and in latent opposition to the
individual subject.

achieves

a

In fact, Hegel claims,

the subject

perfect identity with the object only in his

epistemological relation to it.

By the act of thinking,

the subject takes the object out of its externality and

transforms it into an idea internal to mind.
In thinking an object, I make it into thought and
deprive it of its sensuous aspect; I make it into
something which is directly and essentially mine.
Since it is in thought that I am first by myself,
I do not penetrate an object until I understand
it; it then ceases to stand over against me and I
have taken from it the character of its own which
.^^
it had in opposition to me
.

In fully rational thought,

.

the mind strips the object of

all accidental and transient properties accruing to its

phenomenal existence, and captures its essence or reason.
The rational idea is neither a mere copy of sense data,
nor a distorted image of external reality, but rather is
the object's inner truth.

Rational thought is not only
44
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the highest but also the most inclusive ontological rela-

tion of subject to object, because it enfolds all other

relations within itself.

The thinking subject reflects on

its prior experiences, discards their incidental moments,

discerns and preserves their essential meanings, and thereby absorbs its objective relations as pure thoughts within
its developing reason.

But the subject does not engage

epistemologically with the object simply when it reflects
upon past experience.
cal:

to experience an object, whether as raw nature or as

the State,

ness.

Experience is itself epistemologi-

to have already taken it into ones conscious-

is

The various objects which the subject confronts,

then, are at once distinctions within its own mind.

Hegel shows that the subject's attainment of true

knowledge of the object is an extremely laborious process.
Human thought undergoes

a

development which is logical,

loosely historical, and biographical ("The particular in-

dividual

.

.

.

has also to go through the stages through

which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road

which has been worked over and levelled out."

)

Each

stage entails a specific construction of objectivity or
enmode of transforming the object into thought; it also

knowing.
tails a specific interpretation of the activity of
not in full.
Mind's theory of its own activity in part, but
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infects and circumscribes that activity.

The dynamic of

thought arises out of the tension between the way in which

mind interprets knowledge and knows the object in accordance with this interpretation, and the way in which it

knows the object in contradiction to this interpretation.
This tension pushes mind to elaborate increasingly more

adequate theories of knowledge, which allow for and articulate an increasingly adequate construction
ject of thought.

of the ob-

Each new mode of thought comprehends and

surpasses the limitations of the last; and each has its
own,

limited validity as a necessary moment in the develop-

ment of rational knowledge.
Hegel traces the temporal evolution of mind all
the way from the Stoicism and Scepticism of antiquity,

through 19th century German romanticism.

The predominant

logical shapes mind manifests in history, and the major

claimants for the ascertainment of truth, are three: Bare
Experience, Scientific Understanding, and Philosophy.

The

least adequate level and theory of knowledge. Bare Experi-

ence or "naive consciousness," is knowledge as the imme-

diate and passive reception of pure, unorganized sense
data; or at a slightly more sophisticated level, of unre-

lated objects with properties.

Its self -interpreting

theory is akin to an empiricism of respectively the pheno-

menalist and object-realist sort.

The second level and
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theory of knowledge is Scientific Understanding, which
arises out of the inability of Bare Experience to account
for knowledge which the mind in fact has of the world.

Scientific Understanding reflects upon the observable object in order to discover its essential nature: its generic and species identity and its external, causal relations

with other objects.

Science admits that this nature is

not immediately observable in the object but believes that
it can be inferred or abstracted from that which is ob-

servable.

The highest level and theory of knowledge is

Philosophy or Speculative Science.

Philosophy knows the

object ultimately through the deductive process of thought
alone, knows it as internally related to other objects and
as a necessary expression of the rational whole, and knows

Reason as the Absolute Subject which objectifies itself in
the observable world.

Hegel insists that the epistemolo-

gical and explanatory supremacy of Philosophy does not annul the worth of Scientific Understanding, or indeed of

Bare Experience.

Experience has limited validity in its

being rooted in the actual world; Scientific Understanding,
in its rational mediation of bare sense impressions, its

preparation of particular facts into classif icatory universals and general laws.

Philosophy then transforms em-

pirical into logical universality and necessity.

It de-

-particularizing
rives the particular object from its self
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universal or concept, and its concept from the self-

differentiating Idea.

By warranting the contents of em-

pirical science absolutely and logically--rather than con-

tingently and empirically--necessary and universal, Philosophy gives them "the freedom of thought," so that they
no longer depend for their truth on the evidence of the

sensed fact.

"The fact as experienced thus becomes an il-

lustration and a copy of the original and completely selfsupporting activity of Thought." 2 5
Hegel's analysis of Experience foreshadows con-

temporary critiques of both phenomenalism and object realism.
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According to Hegel, Experience as "sense-

certainty," the view that all knowledge is the passive re-

cipience of unique sense impressions, dissolves of itself

because non-conceptual sensation can yield no truth beyond
the bare fact that knower and known simply are.

Mind of

course does know more than this--the very point of its concept "knowledge" is to denote going beyond registering the

existence of otherwise uncharacterizeable particulars.
Conversely, knowledge as this going beyond cannot be ac-

quired through the passive recipience of sense data.

To

know anything about a particular is at once to conceptualize

— to

organize experience by means of universals

subsuming (and for Hegel the inner truth of) both knower
and known, universals which by definition cannot be sensed.
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Without the conceptual activity of mind, the world would
be no more than an ephemeral series of the unmarked and

unmarkable.

With it, the truth of the object "lies in the

object as my object, or lies in the meaning, in what
'mean'."

27

I

Experience as "perception," the view that it

is possible to know unrelated objects with properties

rather than mere sense-data does admit to the necessary
use of universals to designate the experiencing self and
the object and its properties.

But perception cannot ac-

count for a given conglomerate of properties' being si-

multaneously a single object, v/ithout subverting the independence of the object by attributing to mental activity
either the unifying of diverse properties into a single
entity, or the breaking down of a single entity into di-

verse properties.

Further, perception's claim that each

object is wholly related to any other is contradicted by
its claim that what makes a thing itself and not another

thing, is a certain set of properties.

For the very pro-

perties which make a thing what it is, relate it positively with other things with similar properties, and nega-

tively with other things with opposite properties.

Scientific Understanding contains the insights of
"sense-certainty," in that it begins with the directly
given sense impression.

It contains the insights of "per-

as
ception" in that it v^orks with the sensed particular

a
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universal, rather than as
nomenon.

a

unique and unrepeatable phe-

It goes beyond both in that it does not stop at

describing the sensible world, but penetrates its external
transient appearance to its non-sensible, permanent essence.

Scientific Understanding defines this essence as

the purely external relations which characterize the ob-

servable thing.

These include the classif icatory rela-

tions between the individual and its species (the "self-

relation"); the causal relations between the individual
thing and other, different things (the "other-relation");
and the relations between the individual thing and other

things which express the workings of forces such as magnetism, gravity, and electricity.

The observable object

mediates between the scientific mind and the "supersensible v;orld" of species, causal laws and forces.

It is the

task of empirical science to infer general propositions

and theories from this particular object, to find "the

Necessary element, or Laws, in the apparent disorder of
the endless masses of the fortuitous."
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The theoretical

concepts of science, needless to say, are not merely con-

ventional but must conform to the system of nature.

While

empirical science does not equate the true essence of
things with their sensible appearance, it still purports
particular,
to derive the relations between species and

empirical
cause and effect, force and expression, from
conexperience alone, so that these relations are only
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tingently true.

Yet, Hegel notes, the fact that empirical

science assumes without the logical possibility of empirical proof that the laws it discovers are universal and

permanent, bespeaks an implicit awareness that these laws
are rooted in Reason and not in mere observable phenomena.

This dubious

shov/ of

support for empirical science

aside, Hegel argues that its self -interpretation is false,
its method is weak, and its understanding of the object
of inquiry, highly unsatisfactory.

First, empirical Sci-

ence claims that its general ideas correspond to sensible

phenomena or are reducible to ideas which do so.

While it

begins with the observable object, however, at the moment
of scientific analysis it ushers in concepts like "one,"

"many," "force," "cause," "contingency," which have no

concrete analogues in the physical world.
ism,

Even material-

the companion to empiricism which holds that all of

reality is reducible to physical matter, is a self-

deceptive form of idealism.

For "matter" itself is a

thought or abstraction which corresponds to no senseMost important, the very goal of Scientific

datum at all.

Understanding

— the

discovery of universal laws and neces-

sary connections between things--cannot be attained (as

Hume had noted)

through sense perception alone.

29

Of

course Hegel concludes differently than Hume: "And thus
reappear.
once more we see the axiom of bygone metaphysics
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that the truth of things lies in thought.

"'^^

Only to the

extent that science in practice contradicts empiricism in
theory, does it merit its title.

sympathy

v/ith

Hegel is, however, in

empirical theory on one point.

In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation.
This principle contradicts
that ought- to-be
... No less than Empiricism,
philosophy recognizes only what is, and has nothing to do with what merely ought to be.-^-^
.

'

'

Both empiricism and absolute idealism deny any methodological ground for criticizing

a

given order of things.

Em-

piricism does so, because it believes only in the truth of
strictly observable facts, so that it is confined within
the boundaries of "what is."

Absolute Idealism does so,

for a quite opposite reason: it asserts that the actual,

observable world is expressive of Thought, so that the
actual is already rational.
Second, Hegel finds inadequate the method by which

science explains the observable thing in terms of species,
laws and forces.

These generalizations, after all, are

only repetitions in universal and permanent form of the

particular, transient cases they purport to explain.

To

account for the fact that b does x when c does y, by the
law that whenever C does Y, B does X, is to state merely
the same content as before,

inwardness.

"-^^

In any case,

"translated into the form of
the external and contingent

mind
relations science finds in the world, do not provide
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with an ultimate knov;ledge of first principles and final
causes. 33

^

Empirical science only explains the observable
.

.

,

thing in terms of some contingent factor, which "may or

may not be

.

.

whose being or not being

.

not on Itself but on something else." 34

.

.

.

depends

Hegel believes

that a necessity dependent on antecedent conditions which

themselves are unnecessary, is not as powerful an explanation as a necessity v/hich simply and categorically is, "a

simple self -relation
else IS removed."

35

,

in which all dependence on something

Lastly, the necessity exhibited in

causal laws and forces is

a

blind one.

It does not know

itself, and it does not determine itself.

It then is of a

lesser order than the necessity which stems from a selfconscious, self -determining Reason.

Because of these methodological limitations, empirical science can comprehend nothing of Universal Reason as the inner content of the world, a good deal
the full truth)

(but not

of physical nature, and very little of pur-

posive, intersubjective human life.

Science begins to

have difficulties, Hegel believes, when it tries to ex-

plain the behavior of simple, unconscious organic life.
The simple organism is governed by a concealed purpose or

"notion"--the preservation of its identity--and this purobservable
pose cannot be observed or inferred purely from
„

facts, but "can only be apprehended conceptually."

37

Sci-
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ence confronts its most serious problems, however, when it
seeks to explain self-conscious human life.

logical science looks at mind as
thing.

a

First, psycho-

passive, determined

It treats mind as an entity which is separate from

its objective relations, and explains it in terms of exter-

nal factors and causes.

In truth,

is his most critical point--,

with its objective world,

Hegel asserts--and this

the individual mind is fused

for in the hierarchy of v/ays al-

ready examined, this world reflects and gives content to
the subject.

Since the mind is internally related to its

situation, any explanation is moot which presumes a clear

distinction between cause and effect and treats mind as
determined by something fully independent of it.
science as physiognomy and phrenology
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Second,

identifies the in-

ner self with permanent mental dispositions it infers from

sensible physical traits.

3 9

Hegel first of all strongly

condemns the attempt to view the body as expressive of the
mind.

The inner body, whether as bone structure or inter-

nal organs, is simply a physical given and has no internal

connection to consciousness.

Certain facets of the ex-

terior body, the eyes or mouth, for example, may express
the mind, but only insofar as the inner self can manipu-

late them at will.

In short,

the particular shape of the

of
body has no direct relation to the particular content

the mind.

The body is largely a medium through which the
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mind expresses itself in speech and action, and conversely
it is at speech and action that one looks in order to know

the inner self of another person.

Hegel secondly refuses

to attribute the subject's words and acts to some static

psychological disposition.

Rather, he believes that they

reflect the subject's inner development towards reason and

self-determination.

This development both is natural to

the human subject and, as Hegel noted earlier, is informed
by the specific ideas of justice, duty, and right which
the subject finds in his social world.

According to Hegel, Philosophy is the highest level
and theory of knowledge.

Only Philosophy is able to grasp

the conscious life of the human subject, the inner meaning

of its speech and actions, the intersub jective norms and

rules which help constitute social relations, and the Reason which underlies all things.

The content of Philosophy,

which Hegel also calls "Speculative Science" and "Absolute
Knowledge," is no more and no less than Hegel's own philosophical system.

It includes the system's entire sweep

from the self -deduction of the Abstract Idea through its

externalization as nature, its development as human subjectivity in its various relations to the object, and its

consciousness of itself as the unity of Thought and the

phenomenal world.

Because Philosophy is just this "Day-

light of the Idea's development and revealed riches,
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Hegel's climactic discussion of it is very short.

Abso-

lute Knowledge is simply if momentously the announcement
of the full fruition of all that has gone before, the

whole journey of Thought travelled and recollected.

Be-

fore we examine the form or method of Philosophy, we should

remember that it does reserve

a

place for empirical sci-

ence as a progressive if lesser mode of knowledge.

Sci-

entific Understanding marks the limited triumph of the
independent, reflective, analytic mind, which is able to
make its discoveries exact] y because it assumes a stance
of detachment tov/ards the world around it.

Philosophy

does not entirely invalidate those discoveries when it re-

veals both subject and object to be expressive of Mind.
Rather, it heals the wound opened by Scientific Under-

standing: the alienation of the human subject from the ob-

jective world, and the subject's explanation of itself as

determined by external, objective causes.

CHAPTER

III

THE METHOD OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCE
We turn now to the method v/hich at once governs
the real development of the world, and provides the most

complete knowledge of it.

The dialectic is both the in-

ner dynamic of existence and the true form of scientific
analysis.

It is the second because it is the first: the

dialectic of the concept "is not an activity of subjective
thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather
the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and

fruit organically."
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Because the movement of the objec-

tive world determines the proper form of explanation, mind

must look on at its subject-matter "without for its part
adding to it any ingredient of its own."
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This of

course does not mean that the truth of reality is trans-

parent to simple sensory observation.

Hegel has shown

that to know is at once to mediate the empirically given

with thought, and that to know scientifically is to pierce
through phenomenal reality to its rational essence.

Fur-

thermore, the dialectical method of explanation is a

highly sophisticated one which emerges only after

development of the human mind.

a

long

Because he sees his sci-

entific method as internal both to objective reality and
57
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to human history, by the way, Hegel can account for his

own thought with complete theoretical ease.

This is an

intellectual pleasure in which the empirical scientist
cannot indulge.
Every actual thing involves a
posed elements.
Consequently
other words, to comprehend an
lent to being conscious of it
of opposed determinations.^''

coexistence of opto know, or in

object is equivaas a concrete unity

The central insight of dialectical thinking, and
the central core of dialectical reality, is that the whole
is a concrete unity of opposites.

The method, however,

embraces three stages or "moments" which lead to this
unity.

(1)

The first moment of the method as existential

dynamic is the existence and subsistence of finite,
atomic things--whe ther these are particular rocks, trees
and persons or particular epochs, cultures and philoso-

phies--to which certain predicates characteristically apply and other characteristically do not.

Because the

world is differentiated in this way, the first moment of
the method as scientific analysis is the division of its

subject-matter into fixed and limited universals, each of
Thus,

which is distinct from and exclusive of the others.
for example, one divides "philosophy" into "classical

idealism," "skepticism," "realism" etc., in such

a

way

that "idealism" includes only "its own" ideas and not
those characteristic of "realism" or "skeptcism."

Such
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analytic activity is indispensable for knowledge, which
requires that "every thought shall be grasped in its full
precision, and nothing allowed to remain vague and indefinite." 4 5

(2)

However, contrary to the claims of em-

piricism, every existent thing only on one side is a

"self-identical," fixed, and independent being.

On the

other side, it is fraught with internal contradictions.
Later we will examine the principle of contradiction which
leads every particular thing to transform itself and

which subverts its independent identity.

For now we need

note only that a thing can contradict itself because it
is expressive of an idea

idea of itself as

a

— or

rather, of two ideas: the

perfected being, and the idea of it-

self as an independent, self-limiting whole.

It will

suffer contradiction if it is a less than adequate ex-

pression of either.
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The opposition inherent in all

finite things forces scientific thought beyond its own

boundaries.

Since "[t]here is absolutely nothing what-

ever in which we cannot and must not point to contradictions or opposite attributes

," ^

^

the conceptual distinc-

tions science makes in its first moment, it undermines in
its second.

(3)

Empiricism believes the world to be made

of positive facts, and knowledge of true statements about
them.

Skepticism believes that knowledge ends in the ne-

so
gation of all positive statements about the world and
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in the negation of knowledge itself.

gainst both

Hegel insists a-

that "the negation which emerges as the re-

sult of the dialectic is, because a result, at the same
time positive." 4 8

As it is the negation of "specific

propositions," it has its own, specific and positive content.

The third moment of the dialectic yields not a

mere denial of

a

given, fixed truth, but a more developed

and internally harmonious existent, and a more articulated
and complete thought of it.
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The dialectic process re-

conciles positive and negative moments in a higher, new

positive one, and then begins anew.

The more developed

object negates itself, and the more inclusive thought
presses beyond its old boundaries.

The end of existen-

tial and epis temological dialectic somes only with the

Thought of the Infinite Whole: the reality which encloses
every contradictory existent within itself, and the

thought beyond which it is impossible to travel.
We have established that Hegel's dialectical me-

thod is both scientific analysis and real dynamic, and
that as both analysis and dynamic it entails three mo-

ments or stages.

We now must examine the fundamental

principles of which the method is made.
Appearance is the process of arising into being
and passing away again, a process that itself
does not arise and does not pass away, but is
per se, and constitutes reality and the lifemovement of truth.

1
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The most obvious and the most abstract principle of the

method is that of movement.

It is an obvious principle

because of the dynamic quality inherent in

method which

a

moves restlessly from unproblematic truth to its disintegration through internal contradiction to a new unproblematic truth.

It is an abstract principle because to

say that reality is inherently in motion and flux is not
to say very much.

A second, more articulated expression

of the dialectic is that it is self -movement

problematic truth negates itself

,

physic.

An un-

and both truth and ne-

gation are collected and retained in
truth.

.

a

more complete

Here we have the kernel of Hegel's entire metaIt is unnecessary to retrace the imminent dy-

namic of the system of Reason as a whole, in which Reason posits itself as Abstract Thought, negates itself as

Abstract Thought and posits itself as the external world,
and finally returns to itself as the self-conscious unity
of the two moments.

5

But it is worth noting that to

crack the self-movement of this Whole at any point is to
find a part which is itself a smaller whole in its own

process of self-movement.

Crack open this second whole,

and one will find yet another.

The Idea; and within the

Idea the spheres of Logic, Nature, and Spirit; within the

sphere of Logic, the categories of Being, Essence, and
Notion; and within the category of Notion, the Objective

,
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Notion, Subjective Notion, and Idea— each undergoes an

immanent development in which it both negates and retains
every particular moment within itself.

This self -movement

becomes even more complex in the realm of Spirit.

For

here, not only is there a logical sel f -development from,
for example,

family to civil society to the state within

the whole of Ethical Life, or from art to religion to

philosophy within the whole of Absolute Knowledge; but
each of these self-moving wholes and each whole within it

undergoes
history.
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a

temporal development as well--that is, has

a

All of this movement and change except that

which is pure "caprice" or "sport" manifests some aspect
of the Concept's "elaborations upon itself." 5 3

Conse-

quently, in contrast to the empirical scientist who begins with concrete particulars and abstracts from them

universals which name their common characteristics, the

dialectical scientist looks to the abstract universal
which will produce out of itself its concrete determinations.
gel,

The point of scientific analysis, admonishes He-

in a statement which sums up the idealist explana-

tory enterprise,

"is to look at the way in which the con-

cept determines itself and to restrain ourselves from

adding thereto anything of our thoughts and opinions."
All of reality, then, is marked by self -movement

but to explain how this movement occurs one must point to

,
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that most infamous dialectical principle, contradiction

.

"Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world
.

.

.

[although] contradiction is not the end of the mat-

ter, but cancels itself."
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Every determinate thought,

thing, and moment comes into conflict with itself and

transforms itself into its opposite or negation.

Na-

ture's negation of the Idea, and Spirit's negation of Nature, are archetypal.

In every lesser entity lurks the

same "portentous power of the negative." 5 6

This power,

however, is itself a new positive content: Nature, for
example, is not simply "not-Idea," but is the positive

content of the external, material world.

The process of

the self -movement of any whole is just this succession of

positive forms.

Further, each new positive retains the

truth of its predecessors.

Nature is the externalization

as well as the negation of the Idea

asleep").

(it is the

"Idea

Spirit is Mind which not only negates but has

developed out of Nature and retains the whole of that development in thought.

Thus a negation is not like an

illusion that is broken upon the advent of the truth.
The concept

determines itself, posits its own determinations
and in turn abolishes them (transcending itself)
and by this very process of abolition and transcending gains an affirmative, ever richer and
more concretely determined form.
The negations which become positive forms, the positive
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forms which issue in their own negations, and the moment
of negation itself, are expressions of the Whole and
are

retained within it as partial truths.
What exactly does Hegel mean when he says that
thought or thing contradicts itself?
nate thought, because it has

a

(1)

a

Every determi-

specific and so

a

bounded

content, is in contradiction with itself as an expression
of the Thought of the Whole.

thought can be thought beyond.

For every determinate
This inner contradiction

leads each thought past its own boundaries to its nega-

tion--a new, more comprehensive thought inclusive of the
truth of the old.

(2)

Every determinate thing which has

not yet realized its own idea, is not what it truly is.

This contradiction leads the thing beyond the limits of
its present existence, to a more perfect expression of

its essential self.

Since every particular thing is fi-

nite, however, it eventually decays and dies; its idea is

preserved through the preservation of its species or
type.

The relation of natural particulars

to their uni-

versal is a static one: each new particular simply replicates the idea of the last, and the universal is pre-

served through this repetition of particulars.

The rela-

tion of spiritual particulars to their universal is dynamic: the various ideas which the particulars express
universal.
are progressive elaborations of their spiritual

)
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For example, each particular state has its own idea which
it strives to realize,

and the historical series of par-

ticular states and their qualitatively distinctive ideas
reveals, over time, the developing universal Idea of the
State.

Every finite, determinate thing is in contra-

(3)

diction with itself as the idea of an independent whole.
For the fact that

a

thing is determinate and finite means

that it is bounded, and this entails that it is bounded
by something other than itself.

This "other," then, helps

determine the finite thing and is included within the
thing's identity.

Thus the finite thing is all that it

is not and so is negated as a self-identical entity.

(Hegel believes that the thing not only entails its

"other" but actively seeks to become its other by going

beyond its own boundaries.
ters itsel f

This occurs when a thing al-

.

In truth, however,

the "other" which negates the

independence of every determinate thing is, along with
that thing, a companion part of a larger whole.

The re-

lations the thing has with other things are then not ex-

ternal and contingent but internal and necessary relations, so that the thing is not limited and determined
larger whole,
by an alien fo-ce but is, as part of the

self-limiting and self-determining.

A consequence of

that to understand
the principle of internal relations is
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the particular thing is to understand it in its relations

with all other things within

a

given whole.

For example,

a particular set of laws must be understood against the

habits, mores, institutions, etc., which along with the
lav/s

express a particular national culture or "spirit."

This particular whole provides the first context for the

explanation of the particular thing but, in that the whole
itself is an organic part of

a

larger whole, not the last.

Thus, the terms of explanation for particular laws in-

clude not only their internal relations to other parts of
a

particular national spirit, but also the internal rela-

tions of that national spirit to other national spirits

which are parts of the se 1 f -developing "World Spirit."
Ultimately, the contradiction inherent in every finite
thing is resolved only when that thing is shown to be a

part of the Infinite Whole or Idea, which has no limits
and hence is not in contradiction with some other thing

which lies beyond itself.
The determinate thing, then, is a necessary part
of a larger whole.

This principle of necessity underlies

the apparent contingency of things in the world.

Because

marthe world is external, material, and temporal, it is
red by true contingency: by pure "sport" or "caprice,"
"may as well
the irrational thing, event, or action which

not be as be."^^

But most of what appears to be contin-
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gent is in truth the manifestation of its particular
idea
and the Idea of the Whole.

While the historian concerns

himself with the narration of appearance, whether it be
truly fortuitous or not, the task of the scientist is
first to fathom the rational Idea of the

V^/hole,

second to

expose the inner necessity of the only apparently contin-

gent particulars, and to treat the fortuitous not at all.
The principle of necessity accrues to the dynamic
of each particular whole as well as to its composition at

any one moment or stage.

Given that this is so, and

given that each whole is self-moving rather than moved by
an external cause, the entire content of its development

must be implicit in its first, most abstract and unarticulated moment.

That the dynamic of reality tends of its

own internal necessity toward an inherent end is

principle of the Hegelian dialectic.

a

fifth

This teleological

principle applies to the method as analysis also: "the

whole progress of philosophizing in every case, if it be
a

methodical, that is to say

a

necessary, progress,

merely renders explicit what is implicit in

a notion.

,,6

0

The dialectic is a succession of positive moments, each

born out of and negating the last, but the process is not
one of spontaneous self -creation

.

explicit through self-struggle of
implicit in the last.

It is rather a becoming
a series of

moments each

The whole which develops according
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to an inner necessity develops

to its own purpose.

freely— that

is,

according

The Idea depends on nothing from with-

out itself; it is
its own exclusive pre-supposi tion and absolutely
final purpose, and itself works out this purpose
from potentiality into actuality, from inward
source to outward appearance
this Idea or
Reason is the True, the Eternal, the Absolute
Power ... it and nothing but it
mani.^^
fests itself in the world
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Hegel's brief discussion of philosophy in his preface to the Phenomenology exemplifies the principle of

teleological development through contradiction.

The vari-

ous philosophical systems of the past, Hegel remarks, seem

independent and indeed mutually exclusive of each other.
In reality,

they constitute in their very antagonisms

"the progressive evolution of truth."
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Although else-

where Hegel distinguishes historical development through
internal struggle from a naturally pacific organic teleology,

here he likens the history of philosophy to the

growth of a plant.

The bud is supplanted by the flower,

with which it is incompatible; the flower by the fruit.
Yet each is part of the same organic whole, within which
they are both contradictory and mutually necessary.

losophy likewise evolves through

a

Phi-

progression of antago-

nistic systems, each incompatible with the next, yet all

necessary parts of, and reconciliable within, the whole
of philosophic knowledge.

The different philosophical
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systems are "one philosophy at different degrees of ma-

...

turity.

In philosophy the latest birth of time is

the result of all the systems that have preceded it, and

must include their principles; and so

.

.

.

will be the

fullest, most comprehensive and most adequate system of
all"„

6 4

flower)

(in this sense,
.

unlike the relation of fruit to

A consequence for scientific analysis of the

teleological pirnciple is that one must look to the more

developed self to explain the less.

At the same time,

the truth of the whole is not only its final stage, but
is

the entire process of its working out.

The historical advance of Spirit from implicit

possibility to explicit actuality through "hard, infinite
struggle against itself,"
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is most dramatically illus-

trated in Hegel's conception of social change.
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Here

the World Spirit develops through the emergence, matura-

tion, and disintegration of particular national spirits.
As we have seen, a national spirit or state is the to-

tality of habits, traditions moral and legal duties and
,

rights, a constitution, an artistic, scientific, and

philosophic temperament, which have

which a given people share.

a

common principle and

"Only with such a religion

can there be such a form of the State, and only with such
a

State such art and such philosophy."
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The particular

nation is limited and mortal, with its own cycle of de-
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velopment and decline.

Vital as long as it is bringing

its inner principle from potentiality to concrete ac-

tuality, the state in its maturity loses its dynamism.
Its citizens have completed their struggle of self-

creation, and have the leisure to lean back to reflect
on themselves.

Such self-reflection is a corrosive act.

It leads them beyond the authority of their ethical or-

der,

to question long-established rights, duties, and

customs.

This self-critique of a social order marks the

emergence of a new spiritual principle and
sive standard of rationality.

social whole
a new,

— that

more inclu-

The hidden secret of every

it contains within itself the seeds of

higher principle-- "makes all existing reality un-

stable and disunited."
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Within the old world, the inner

spirit of the new is "already knocking
shell,

a

in order,

...

as against a

finally, to burst forth and break it

into pieces; but it is

a

belongs to the shell. "^^

kernel different from that which
The old order crumbles away,

and a new one arises which begins its own process of de-

velopment, self-reflection, and decline.
While the thought and action of the masses help
build and maintain a particular spiritual order, it is
into
the rare "world-historical individual" who brings

being a new social whole.

Hegel's theory of the world-

tranhistorical figure shows his perceptive grasp of the

1

71

sitional historical mentality (confined, however,
to the
minds of a few great men) and his ultimately
idealist

explanation of human action.

The world-historical indi-

vidual acts according to private passions and purposes

subversive of the established state.

He understands the

limitations of the old age and the truth of the new, "the
next genus, so to speak, which is already formed in the

womb of time." 7 0

But these passions and purposes are the

guise through which the will of the World Spirit secretly
works.

Not being philosophers, the world-historical in-

dividuals know nothing of the Idea as such, but they make
its immanent reality their own personal aim and goal.

And

so their actions have two explanations, only one of which
is transparent to themselves.

The World Spirit then consists of a progression
of finite national spirits:

"The restless succession of

individuals and peoples, who exist for

a time and

then

disappear," but whose ruin "is at the same time the emergence of

a

new life."

7

It is also a progression of ra-

tionality, self -consciousness

stage of Spirit entails

understanding,

a

a

,

and freedom.

Each new

richer history and self-

more universal standard of reason, and

hence a higher level of freedom than the last.
While the dialectical method is able to grasp
this transformative process, there is one claim Hegel does
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not make on its behalf.

He nowhere suggests that the

speculative scientist can determine the state of any later stage

— whether

of history or of being--on the basis

of information he has at or about an earlier stage.

The

dialectical idealist can be certain that every positive

moment will produce out of itself its necessary antithesis,

ment.

and that this will be a new, necessary positive mo-

But he cannot know the content of this moment in

advance of it, for two reasons.

First, one can predict

neither the ontological nor historical new moment on the
basis of regularities characteristic of an earlier one,
for this new moment negates not only those regularities,

but the identities involved in them.

That is, the new

moment negates "Whenever A, then B" as
also negates A as

(the old)

A,

B as

a

relation, and

(the old)

B.

Se-

cond, given that one cannot predict the historical future

on the basis of present regularities, one cannot predict
it on any other basis, because the mind is always caught

in its own time.

its culture,

It can think only within the terms of

language, past and present; it cannot know

any future expression of Reason because it is itself an

expression of Reason only as the latter has developed itself thus far.

That it is impossible to know

a

later

moment on the basis or from the stance of an earlier one,
be a
means that dialectical idealism, which purports to
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deductive system, can be one only of
sort.

a

most singular

The scientist cannot deduce a conclusion on the

basis of

a

knowledge of the premises alone, but must un-

cover the movement from premise to conslusion only after
that movement has taken place.

He does not, then, de-

duce the facts of the world from the Concept, and the

Concept from an a priori premise.

Rather, he examines

the experience of thinking, which leads of itself to the

Concept, and with the help of the categories of the Concept, he examines the experience of the phenomenal world.

Here he discloses the inner rationality which the Con-

cept guarantees.
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In sum,

he reconstructs the advance

from Concept to Nature to Spirit "after the fact."

CHAPTER

IV

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE EXPLANATION
OF HUMAN ACTION
It is striking that Hegel,

fully aware of the

gains made by the empirical sciences in the past century,

equates true science with philosophy, and philosophy with

knowledge of "notions or conceptions alone."
sion of philosophy is in part Platonic.

"7

His vi-

The philosopher's

task is to reveal the concept as the rational truth of
the world.

He can know this truth neither through intui-

tion nor common sense, but only by means of an arduous

process of mental training and intellectual discipline.
A regulative principle prohibiting fanciful hypotheses,

mere subjective opinions, and peculiarities of mind, governs the philosophical enterprise and makes it systematic.

Hegel ascribes

a

dynamic quality not only to mind

but also to the world it thinks about, and in this way his

idealism is more Aristotelian than Platonic.

Ideas are

immanent in the concrete world and inform the development
of all things.

However, Hegel parts with both classical

thinkers when he declares that ideas and the concrete

world are internal distinctions of Thought, and Thought
develops itself through contradiction, negation, and
74
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struggle.

Thus he conceives of the Notion as the self

which brings opposition out of itself; of scientific
thinking as "a self having knowledge purely of itself in
the absolute antithesis of itself;^^ and of scientific

proof as the account of "how the subject by and from itself makes itself what it is."^^

Empirical science retains

a

legitimate place with-

in the system of Speculative Science, but it suffers

there a definite if gently executed decline in status.

Hegel's greatest complaint against empirical science-that it cannot fathom the Infinite Reason of the v/orld-has long since lost its intellectual appeal for philo-

sophers and social theorists, although it still is the

crux of the theological position.

However, Hegel makes a

series of secondary arguments which foreshadows the con-

temporary case against positivism.

He believes that po-

sitive science, with its fixed propositions and static

vision of

a

universe governed by natural laws, cannot

comprehend the internal dynamic to which all things are
subject.

Further, it confines itself to the study of the

physically observable, which it sees as the only truth or
at least the only truth amenable to scientific investiga-

tion.

Hence it is blind to the full reality of social

life.

It cannot grasp the internal rationality of human

action, which each particular mode of social life both
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supports and reflects.

It cannot penetrate the inner

logic of social practice, of which human actors may or
may not be aware.

It cannot appreciate the historicity

of action--the continual emergence of new forms of social

life and new modes of thought and practice.

Finally, be-

cause it understands neither the ideational component nor
the dynamic quality of social life, it cannot understand

itself--for of course empirical science is
mind which arises only at

a

a

product of

specific moment in history.

Certain features of Hegel's explanatory method,
in turn, anticipate contemporary non-posi tivist analysis.

His theory of the dialectic portrays the world as made of

qualitatively distinct levels of existence.

It stipu-

lates that the characteristics of each higher level are

more inclusive than and not reducible to the characteristics of any lower level.

The dialectic then assures

both a continuity of method in the analysis of natural
and social life, and a discontinuity between the terms of

explanation appropriate for social life and the terms of

explanation appropriate for simple physical nature.

The

dialectic also governs practical innovation in social
life, and accommodates the fact that the identities and

regularities which mark one historical epoch will not ne-

cessarily be true of the next.

Finally, it informs not

only practical but conceptual innovation: the dynamic of
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human thought as it creates and then moves beyond its own
limitations, as it reflects upon and transforms its own
content.
The primary problem for non-idealist dialecticians

becomes one of finding

support other than that of a

a

self-developing Idea, for

a

and human consciousness.

In the century and a half after

dialectic of nature, history,

Hegel's death, at least three possibilities have been suggested.

Each is less than adequate in scope, each is

closely connected to the others, and each is quite clearly intimated in the pages of Hegel's own texts.

winian theory of natural evolution provides

a

The Dar-

strictly

materialist basis for the self-transformation of physical
nature, which at some point issues in conscious and self-

conscious life.

Whether or not Darwin himself was reduc-

tionist in his account of mind, emergence theorists of

nature need not and indeed should not be so.

Marxist

analysis traces the historical transformation of nature,

human nature, and social life, to the central activity of

purposive human labor.

Finally, it is the heart of the

ordinary language and phenomenological argument, that reality is socially constructed not only through practical
labor but through conceptual thought.

Persons think with-

in culturally and politically specific conceptual frame-

works which identify and limit, among other things, the

.
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possibilities for human action.

The promise of practical

innovation rests in part in the capacity of persons to
reflect on and move beyond old conceptual limits, and so
beyond old limits of what actions are possible in their

world
Ironically, while Marxists have been particularly

anxious to shed Hegel's metaphysic

while preserving his

method, they alone have shown sympathy for two of the most

idealist aspects of the dialectic.

The first of these

aspects is that the internal contradiction within every

thing is the contradiction between the thing and its ne-

cessary opposite.

Usually we regard different things as unaffected
by each other.
Everything is thus put outside every other.
But the aim of philosophy is to
banish indifference, and to ascertain the necesThus, for example, inorganic
sity of things.
nature is not to be considered merely something
else than organic nature, but the necessary antithesis of it.^^
.

.

.

.

.

.

Hegel here declares that the different thing is not simply different from but a negation of the first thing.

He

also declares that this negation is not simply a new,

antagonistic moment which issues from and yet is incompatible with the old, the way

a

new twist in the rela-

tionship between husband and wife might be corrosive of
Rather, the

an established set of familial relations.

negation is the thing's necessary opposite

,

and therefore.
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because anything in internal contradiction must give way
to its negation

(which is at once a new positive)

necessary outcome or conclusion.

,

its

This deductive concept

of negation meshes with Hegel's vision of the world as

the embodiment of rational necessity.

However, once

one drops his idealist assumptions, there is no suffi-

cient reason for the claim that organic nature, for example, is the only possible antithesis of inorganic nature rather than simply a new level of nature, in oppo-

sition to, because incompatible with, the definitive pro-

perties of the old.

This point becomes most pressing

when one looks at the dialectic of social formations.
Only an abstract logic of history can provide sufficient

grounds for the claim that the new principles and practices which undermine an established social order from

within, are not only its negation but its necessary negation.

The non-idealist is constrained to make the more

modest case.
The second idealist aspect of the dialectic to

which Marxists are attracted is its progressive portrait
of history.

That history is progressive can mean

things, and Hegel takes it to mean both.

tv/o

First, he be-

lieves that each new positive moment of history includes
the truth of its predecessors

— it

accumulates and sur-

passes their content and so is richer or more "intelli-
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gent."

For example, each new philosophical system not

only moves beyond but also contains the knowledge of all

past systems.

Each new technological epoch incorporates

as well as outdates the advances of its forebearers.

Each

new artistic genre not only reacts against but responds to
a

longer artistic heritage.

This reading of history

stands up without the assumption of an abstract historical Reason, given one important condition: that each

stage of social life remembers its past, although this

memory need not be

a

self-conscious one.

Second, Hegel

believes that each new positive moment of history embodies to

a

greater degree than its predecessors, the Idea

of Reason and Freedom.

While the progress of history is

not linear, but occurs through Spirit's "infinite struggle" against itself, it nonetheless is governed by an im-

manent end.

Now,

just as it is contradictory for non-

idealists to hold that abstractions like "history" move

according to an inner logic, it is contradictory for them
to hold that such abstractions seek to realize their own

ends or goods.

Thus they only illicitly represent the

movement of history as progressive in this second sense.
In sum,

there are certain pretensions of Hegel's

dialectic in which the non-idealist cannot indulge.
cannot argue that

a

She

logical necessity governs natural,

deduce, even
historical, or conceptual transformation; or

after the fact, any one stage out of another.

(Neither,

if she is to use dialectical reason at all, can she pre-

dict the content of any later stage on the basis of regu-

larities holding true at an earlier one.)

Likewise, she

cannot view any of these processes as teleological in and
of themselves.

They do not have their own, immament pur-

poses or strive to attain

a

completed, perfect state, even

though they may be made in part of the purposes and ends
of human actors.

They are progressive only in the sense

and to the extent that each new stage of nature, history,
or human thought is more comprehensive, elaborate, and

"intelligent" than the last. 79

Finally, the non-idealist

cannot presume that the world is essentially rational.
She only can assert that

(1)

to the extent that humans

shape the world in the ways they intend, the world em-

bodies their reason as it develops within

mode of life; and

(2)

a

particular

nature and history, including the

history of unintended consequences, are at least partially
intelligible to the human mind.
ism.

This last point is a tru-

In that it creates its own standard of intelligi-

bility, human reason will be able to understand at least
some things.
His metaphysical claims aside, Hegel created a

method of penetrating

a

world of ceaseless struggle and

creative activity to which positivistic science has no
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access.
a

But he did more than this.

He also constructed

dual mode of analysis which laid the groundwork for
both

interpretive and critical social theory.

On the one hand,

he argues that human actors collectively build an
edifice
of law and moral rules which nurtures and reflects
their

immanent reason.

Thus socially mediated purposes, norms,

and beliefs progressively replace natural instincts and

external causes as the determinants of human action.

On

the other hand, Hegel does not explain action simply or

even primarily in terms of the self-interpretations of

human agents.

When he looks at the most crude and brutal

action as well as the most thoughtful and dutiful, he sees
it as expressive of an objective Reason of which human

actors are unaware.
[H]uman actions in history produce additional
results, beyond their immediate purpose and attainment, beyond their immediate knowledge and
desire.
They gratify their own interests; but
something more is thereby accomplished, which
is latent in the action though not present in
their consciousness and not included in their
design.

Hegel believes that the history of human action has been
a

fundamentally opaque one, in which actors have not un-

derstood the full extent of what they are doing.

Conse-

quently, the speculative scientist must examine that history on two levels: the level of appearance

,

which includes

the concrete practices of social life and the human mean-

ings and intentions which inform it; and the level of

1
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reality, which includes the self -development of the ra-

tional Idea.

These two levels, however, are not irre-

trievably distinct.

The same historical process by which

humans free themselves from the dictates of the instincts
and the pressures of external forces, takes them towards
a

knowledge of the principles of objective Reason.

When

actors articulate their desires and intentions completely
in accordance with rational principles, and act in accord-

ance with their intentions, an interpretive account of

their social life will mirror an account in terms of its
inner Idea.

While Hegel's emphasis on intersub jective meanings
and intentionality is congenial to contemporary interpre-

tive theorists, his distinction between appearance and

reality is far more appealing to critical theorists,

3

who readily concur that "in a simple act something further may be implicated than lies in the intentions and

consciousness of the agent."
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However, because Hegel

believes that a hidden Reason manifests itself in the

concrete practices of human beings, he finds these practices in reality to be always more, never less, rational

than they appear.

Modern critical theorists make impor-

tant revisions in this reading of opacity.

They attri-

bute the appearance/reality split to the fact that humans

themselves author objective constraints, of which they

.
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are unaware, which then determine their actions.

These

actors may believe that they autonomously determine what
they are doing, or they may think that they are governed
by unchangeable natural laws.

They may believe that their

action is governed by neither private aims nor natural
laws, but by social rules, without comprehending the in-

terests those rules protect or the objective constraints

which maintain those interests.

In each case, opacity

bespeaks a loss of control by human actors over their actions, so that these actions in reality are less rational

than they appear to be

Like their critical counterparts, interpretive

theorists reject the notion that a hidden Reason ex-

presses itself in social life.

They differ among them-

selves over whether practice is opaque in other ways.
The most conservative among them believe opacity to be a

permanent feature of social practice.

They see opacity

as originally a function of the primitive state of human

knowledge and later

a

function of the extreme complexity

of social organization.

Slightly less conservative

thinkers view actions as always at least implicitly trans-

parent to their authors, who are aware that their action
is

rule-governed although they may not be able to articu-

late at once the rule their action expresses.

self-understanding provides the basis for

a

Their

sufficient
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explanation of their action.

Lastly, certain interpre-

tive theorists argue that actions may be partially, but

never can be fully, opaque to their own authors.

Thus

social life must be explained by reference to social
rules and intersub jective meanings, structural con-

straints, and the intentions and beliefs of human actors.

Such theorists generally believe that human action can

become fully transparent, given certain changes in social
life which have yet to occur.

These usually are said to

involve transformations in the labor process, as well as,
of course,

transformations in human consciousness.

One of Hegel's most cogent insights is that the

content of philosophy is not a timeless body of truths.
Instead, it is the self-reflection of a particular social

whole,

"its own time apprehended in thought."
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He also

believes that the philosopher's sole task is to contemplate the rational principle already actualized in his
social order.

That philosophy only can mirror the truth

of the present conflicts with Hegel's own insight into

the corrosive nature of self-reflection, which leads the

self beyond customary boundaries of thought and practice.
inevitable
For the absolute idealist, this conflict is an
one.

movement
On the one hand, he must attribute to the

of Thought,

social
the decay of one principle and mode of
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life and the triumph of another.

On the other hand, he

cannot allow for the possibility of legitimate critical
thought within a given social whole, for this would imply the possibility of a disjuncture between the actual
and the rational.

Oddly enough, not only mainstream in-

terpretive theorists but many Marxists as well, who are
among the most staunch opponents of idealism, have ac-

cepted Hegel's conservative notion of philosophy.

If

Hegel is incorrect about idealism but correct about the

dynamic nature of thought, however, philosophy always
will do more than reproduce in thought the principles of
an established order of things.

As the self-reflection

of an age, philosophy already will have moved beyond

habitual practices and relations.

If it concludes its

journey by affirming the principle of these practices and
relations, this affirmation still will be of a different

order from one which is unthinking.

But there is nothing

in the nature of self-reflection which insures it will not

take a radical direction instead.

Lastly, while mental

journeys never entail practical action, they always have

implications for it.

The purely contemplative function

of philosophy is another erroneous notion of idealism

which has found its way into the Marxist camp.
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Hegel states that pure Bein g is the first logical category, because the thought that "everything
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thought.
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reached
by abstraction, not the elimination of all definite character, but the original f eaturelessness which precedes
all definite character and is the very first of all.
And
this we call Being."
Logic p. 125.)
That there is
nothing else but Being is true, but is the most empty,
abstract truth. And because it is empty. Being is Nothings "if when we view the whole world we can only~~say
that everything is, and nothing more, we are neglecting
all specialty and instead of absolute plentitude, we
have absolute emptiness."
(Logic, p. 128.)
This advance from Being to Nothing Hegel describes as a necessary movement of Thought, and it does seem to me to be
the case that the thought of pure Being is at once the
thought of Nothing.
Hegel next claims that the truth of Being and
Nothing is their unity, and that their unity is Becoming
for Becoming involves the attribute of Being and also of
Nothing.
This certainly is an illegitimate move, for
two reasons.
(1) The transition presupposes, when it is
supposed to prove, the truth of the dialectic (i.e., that
a self and its opposite always are resolved in a higher
unity)
What prevents two categories which are both
opposite and identical from remaining so, except the
prior assumption that there must be a higher unity of
the two? That Being is at once Nothing perhaps introduces the concept of "becoming" in the trite sense that
"becomes" means "is at the same time" or "is transformed
But I can find nothing in the idea that
at once into."
Being becomes Nothing in this sense which leads one out
of an eternal "Being becomes Nothing becomes Being" to a
new, higher unity and a more concrete, elaborated category.
(2) The move is illegitimate because although Becoming in the non-trite sense of "becoming something" or
"forming into something" does involve the concepts of
Being (X becomes some being) and Nothing (X had not been
this does not warrant the
the being it is becoming)
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Their unity might
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of the
necessity
sible unity calls into question the
category of Becoming, and hence the deductive character
It also undermines the
of the categories in general.
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Becoming to Determinate Being. For, as I have argued.
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Becoming is not the only possible unity of Beina and
Nothing.
And there is nothing in the idea of constant
Flux, for example, which entails determinate things
quite the contrary.
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,
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:

MARX

At the heart of Marx's explanation of social life,
IS a paradoxical theory of human action.

On the one hand,

he sees human action in highly rationalistic terms.

He

looks for its sources inside the web of social practice
and not in external physical causes.

bor

— that

He celebrates la-

most significant practice of all--as the mas-

tery of human reason over the blind forces of nature.

Most striking, he anticipates an epoch in which human
beings collectively and self-consciously order all aspects of their existence.

On the other hand, Marx is

adamant that the explanation of real action does not lie
in the beliefs and purposes of human beings.

To the con-

trary, he claims that past and present human action has

been objectively determined, although not by
or ideal cause outside itself.
a

a

material

The contradiction between

concept of practice as determined by the rational agency

of its subjects,

and an analysis of real practice as au-

thored by human beings but not determined by them, runs

through all of Marx's work from the Manuscripts to Capital.

tures:

This contradiction emerges at three critical juncin his account of the labor process,

in his dis-

cussion of consciousness, and in his method of scientific
explanation.

In a vital sense,
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it provides the creative
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tension for Marx's critique of capital.
dizes his entire theoretical enterprise.

It also jeopar-

For he can re-

concile his two antithetical notions of action only by

locating the break between them as
time.

a

break in historical

Thus he is forced to read history as the progres-

sion from alienated to unalienated labor, from opaque to

transparent relations, from a society determined by an objective, hidden logic to one determined by the purposes
of its participants.

As we shall see, this reading is

incompatible with Marx's materialism, and is full of other

difficulties as well.

CHAPTER

I

THE PRACTICE OF LABOR
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts

,

Marx asserts against Hegel that human beings are fully
natural creatures dependent on an equally natural external world for their physical sustenance.

They must re-

shape that world to produce what they require to satisfy
their needs, and as they are bodies living in a world of

other bodies, they can do so only through actual practice.

"The fact that man is an embodied

,

living, real,

sentient objective being with natural powers, means that
he has real,

sensuous objects as the objects of his be-

ing, or that he can only express his being in real, sen-

suous objects."''"

But Marx also uses an Hegelian argument

against the "old materialists" when he states that the
natural world transformed by labor expresses the will and

purposes of the human subject.

Through labor, man "hu-

manizes" nature by objectifying his reason in it and thus

increasingly frees himself from nature as an uncontrolled
This ability to mold the object in ac-

external force.

cordance with self-consciously held purposes distinguished
an
man from other animals: "The practical construction of

objective world

,

the manipulation of inorganic nature, is
99

.
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the affirmation of man as a conscious species-being."^

Through production "nature appears as his work and his
reality."

3

Society too is produced by man, but it also

produces him, mediating his thought and action so that
the objectif ication process is never an individually de-

termined one.

The double thrust of Marx's position

— that

embodied, natural being rather than immanent Spirit is
the substance of the real world, and that human beings

transform that world through purposive, socially constituted action--is repeated in Theses

.

Here he goes on to

define humans as historical "ensembles" of social relations

4

The implications of the claim that action is so-

cially constituted surface in The German Ideology

.

Here

Marx reiterates the priority of real, purposive human
action in the shaping of the objective world.

But for

the first time, he uses the concept of the mode of pro-

duction to describe the set of historically specific, socially determined practices through which the human subject transforms the natural object and in conjunction with

which she produces her needs, ideas and social relations.
The concept entails that the production of social life

occurs within limitations independent of the subject's
will, for she must produce her life in the company of

other subjects and upon

a

material and ideational founda-
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tion inherited from past generations.

points follow.

Three important

First, the inherently historical relation

of subject to object means that that relation cannot be

grasped adequately in philosophical, universalis tic terms.
Second, the social production of social life means that

human beings are "the actors and authors of their own
drama"

^

in a way in which Hegel's individual subjects

were not.

But it also suggests that an explanation of

action in terms of the actor's own reasons and purposes
is an insufficient one,

as neither purposes nor action

can be understood apart from a web of purposes and ac-

tions which does not originate with the individual actor.
Third, it is logically possible that the particular sub-

ject--because she is still

a

particular subject

— m.ay

not

experience herself in her real connection to the social
world.

Thus she may help author the drama of social life

without understanding the larger story she is writing;
and she may act intentionally without understanding the

real social sources of her intentions and beliefs.

From

The German Ideology onwards, Marx argues that as social

authors, persons are not self-conscious, in that they do
not plan, understand, or see as their own creation the

totality of social practice.

As social actors, persons

are not self-conscious, in that they are, so to speak,

attached to schedules of purposes and actions.

These
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schedules form

a

larger design which ultimately explains

but is not explicable in terms of the purposes helping
to

compose it.

Marx insists, however, that while action al-

ways will be socially constituted, the fact that it is

determined by objective structure outside the control of
its human authors is the result of historically specific

social arrangements and not part of the human condition.
He therefore is forced to make the difficult argument that

"bearers" of purposes and actions can become, under dif-

ferent conditions, self-conscious human agents.
In the writings of the 1840s, Marx attempts to

resolve the tension between objectively determined action
and real human agency through the motif of alienation.

Although he speaks briefly of alienation in pre-capitalist
societies,

his basic analysis of the separation and in-

version of subject and object through labor is specific
to capitalism.

Capital sunders the natural link between

laboring subject and labored object in such

a

way that

the object gains independence and control of the subject.

The subject becomes a mere means to the production of

commodities; and his objectified labor confronts him as
capital, a hostile being which dominates him, controls
his work and destroys its expressive quality, and in vari-

ous ways separates him from his social self.

This inver-

sion of productive practice, whereby the laboring subject
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does not determine his own productive activity, however,
finds its "definitive resolution" beyond the boundaries
of capitalism.

Finally gaining

debasement and dehumanization

,

a

recognition of its own

labor revolts against the

entire system of capital, and destroys the relation between itself and its opposite.

Under communism, the la-

borer will reclaim his essence as purpose agent.

He ap-

propriates the productive forces which had stood opposed
to him and regulates production to fulfill his needs, ex-

ercise his skills, and objectify his purposes in nature.
He knows himself as an inherently social being and is

capable of explicitly communal relations with other subjects.

Together these subjects control all "natural pre-

mises" of production and are the self-conscious authors
of their social life.

7

This unification of subject and

object, however, is not equivalent to the "natural unity"

which prevails under primitive communism, before the historical emergence of the division of labor.

For the new

relationship is mediated by two innovations bequeathed by
capitalism: a vast accumulation of the means of labor
(knowledge, technique, tools, machinery) on the one hand,
and a rational rather than mystical understanding of na-

ture on the other.

Q

It often is said that the later Marx rejects all

"Hegelian" concern with human subjectivity and intention-
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ality, and presents a thoroughly objectivist theory of

history and capital.
truth.

Nothing can be further from the

The mature Marx has a newly rich appreciation of

history and knowledge of bourgeois productive practice.
But he still holds to the same paradoxical view of action
as socially constituted, purposive, and potentially ra-

tional; yet objectively determined, although not by ma-

terial causes external to practice itself.
The Grundrisse meticulously shows how the produc-

tive process cannot be divorced even analytically from the

social relations in which persons stand to one another.

Marx peels away the physical, immediately observable qualities of human subject, object and productive activity to

expose a complex social constitution of each.

He repeats

his description of the individual as "the sum of inter-

relations, the relations within which these individuals
Q

stand."

He describes the object of labor as an expres-

sion of the productive relations between wage-labor and
capital.

These relations do not show themselves on the

physical surface of the product, which looks the same,
Marx notes, whether it has been made by an independent

peasant or

a

wage- laborer

.

The most important discovery

that he makes in his search beneath the physique of the

object, is that capital itself is objectified labor in a

specific relation to living labor.

It is not simply a

.

105

material object, and certainly not
self-multiplying capacities.

a

material object with

In turn,

the process of

capitalist production is not determined by the
development
of material forces of production, but by the
logic
of the

relation between capital and wage-labor, from which
follow
advances in technology, mechanization, and so on.
In
fact, according to Marx, the most significant result
of
the entire process of capital is the reproduction of the

social relations comprising it."^^
In the Grundrisse

,

Marx also celebrates the labor

process as the means by which human reason expresses itself in the objective world.

He describes the labored

object as the ob jectif ication of reason even

— indeed,

particularly--when he is speaking of fixed capital, which
appears as an independent, simply material agent in capi-

talist production.

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc.
These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will
over nature, or of human participation in nature.
They are organs of the human brain, created by
the power of knowledge ob jectithe human hand
fied.
The development of fixed capital indicates
to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production and to what dethe conditions of social life itself
gree, hence
have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with
,

;

,

,

it

It is in the first volume of Capital

,

however, that Marx

speaks most eloquently of the immanent rationality of the
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labor process, through which the human subject refashions
the natural world by means of her developing powers and
in accordance with her needs, wants, and chosen ends.

Marx's lengthy celebration of labor as purposive, rational and historical

recurrent
here.

12

— has

— rather

than instinctual, blind, and

been quoted too often to bear repeating

But one should note that this philosophical no-

tion of labor as a process by which the human laborer ob-

jectifies herself, is central to Marx's economic analysis
of capital.

His theory of the exploitation of wage-labor

is contingent upon it,

for the value of the commodity,

which holds the secret of exploitation, is entirely a
function of the fact that the commodity is objectified
labor, or "crystallized labor-time."

While the mature Marx's notion of the practical relation of subject and object is thus not a physicalist one,
and entails a concept of labor as purposive and socially

mediated, it is not the case that he begins with

a

study of

intentionality and intersub jective meaning to answer the
question, "What are people doing in bourgeois society?"

Throughout the nine hundred pages of the Grundrisse he
barely touches on issues of consciousness, and with some
crucial exceptions the same is true of Capital

.

Instead,

capital,
he probes the abstract "moments" of the concept of

structure
or to put it otherwise, he uncovers the logical
of the system of capitalist production.

As he states in
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Capital, he deals with individuals and their
purposes
"only insofar as they are the personifications of
economic

categories, embodiments of particular class relations and
class interests. "^^

At a later point we shall examine thi:

method of analysis, which is as little interpretive as it
is empirical.

For now, let us note that Marx again uses

the theme of alienation and inversion to show how social

practice is determined by forces other than the agency of
its participants.

And he again locates the break between

alienated and unalienated action in the juncture between

capitalist and pre-capitalist society, and between capital
ism and communism.
In the Grundrisse

,

Marx finds an "immediate iden-

tity" of subject and object in systems of communal and

small free landed property which preceded the rise of

capitalism.

Here the subject enjoyed a "natural unity"

with the land and viewed himself and other subjects as
masters of the productive process.

In the "artificial"

craft and guild communities the subject had direct pro-

prietorship in and control over his instruments of labor,
and exercised a single skill which nonetheless allowed

him to develop both mental and bodily faculties.

Even

the slave and serf were united with the objective condi-

tions of labor, if only because they were treated as part
of them.

The immediate subject/object unity is described

in Capital as the system of private property based on the
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labor of the owner, in which the independent peasant or

artison was "fused together" with the objective conditions
of his labor.

Primitive capital accumulation spelled the

forcible expropriation of the private property of the producer, the concentration of the scattered means of produc-

tion in

a

few hands, and the domination of the laborer by

the objective conditions of labor in the form of alien

capital.

Through an exchange in which wage-labor yields

its creative, value-multiplying capacity to capital and

receives in return its value as a fixed magnitude (the
"secret" of capital)

,

living labor re-affirms itself as a

mere moment of capital and the means to its enrichment.
Thus does labor's own result become "objectified labour
as mastery, command over living labour."

14

The inversion

of the laborer into the means for the increase of capital,

and the inversion of the objective conditions and pro-

duct of labor into an alien subject controlling the pro-

ductive process, is reflected in every facet of the relation between wage-labor and capital.

Their own associa-

tion at the workplace, for example, appears to workers as
an association external to them, dictated by capital and

part of its productive power.

The means of production,

intelligent
far from being the mere "material of his own
"^^ subjugate and exploit the laborer.
productive activity,

his skill
The system of capitalist manufacture breaks up
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altogether and turns him into its "conscious organ."

The

social growth of knowledge underlying every advance in

technology, stands against the worker as an attribute of
fixed capital.

And as living labor creates greater and

greater quantities of surplus product, "the objective

conditions of labour assume an evermore colossal independence

.

.

.

social wealth confronts labour in more power-

ful portions as an alien and dominant power.

""'"^

Because wage- laborers are the authors of productive practice without being its controlling agents, Marx

explains that practice not in terms of the intentionality
of its participants, but in terms of its objective, inner

logic.

The crucial question remains: v/hat precisely is

the intersection between the intentionality of individual

actions in capitalist society and the logic of those actions as a whole?

The question is especially complicated

because Marx claims that intentional action not only main
tains the capital-wage labor relation but is also a neces

sary means to its collapse.

The texts of the Grundrisse

and Capital suggest three distinct intersections.

First,

the intentional acts of individuals may flow from and

directly express the structure of the capital-wage labor
relation.

The worker who seeks to acquire exchange value

through the sale of her labor power provides an obvious
case in point.

Her action is

a

function of

a

system of

8
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production in which she is dependent upon capital for
the conditions of her labor, and in which exchange value
is

the universal mediator between individuals and the use

values they create.

In this way,

the intentional action

by which she sells her labor-power reflects the "dull

compulsion of economic relations."

1

7

Far more striking,

however, is Marx's insistence that the capitalist's con-

stant urge to increase value is likewise structurally de-

termined (and thus is distinguished from the "merely idiosyncratic" greed of the miser)

.

It is not that one can

predict an individual capitalist's thought and action on
the basis of abstract economic categories.

Intentional

actions reflecting the dynamic of those categories are
not exhaustive of actions in bourgeois society; an indi-

vidual, for example, may choose to dissipate his capital
on personal luxuries, or may shorten the work-day in his

factory for the benefit of his employees.

But only inso-

far as his aim is not the enjoyment of use-value or the

well-being of his workers but rather "the appropriation
of ever more and more welath in the abstract,"

1

does

he act as "the personification of capital," and this fact
is deducible from the structure of capitalist produc-

tion.

'''^

The individual, in sum, may have a variety of

intentions extraneous or even antithetical to this structure.

But he functions as a capitalist only insofar as

Ill

he acts with the sole purpose of expanding value.

insofar as he functions as

a

And

capitalist, the inner logic

of the capital-wage-labor relation determines his action,

whether it be the raising of labor's productivity, the

extension of capital, or the investment in new technology.
Such action this is purposive but not self-explanatory.
Nor does it provide the final locus of explanation for

capitalist practice as a whole.
The second intersection is one in which the inten-

tional action of individual subjects flows from the logic
of the capital-wage-labor relation but seems discordant

with it.

When the worker sells her labor-power to the

capitalist for an equivalent in wages, for example, it is
clear that she typically intends to do so.

It is equally

clear that the organization of production requires that
she do so.

It is not the case that she intends what Marx

reveals to be the result of her action: that she will

produce independent value which will confront her as capitalist, that "labour will create alien property and pro-

party will command alien labour,"

increasing extent.

20

and this to an ever

The process of obfuscation by which

the purposes and beliefs of the worker do not mesh with,

but equally do not comprehend, the consequences of her
action,^''"

is however a product of the structure of pro-

duction itself.

For these purposes and beliefs are con-

.

.
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gruent with the surface relations of that structure,
which

mystify and hence help perpetuate the depth relations in
a way we shall explore later.

Marx briefly but most significantly mentions

a

third relation between intentional action and the structure of productive practice as a whole.

Certain actions

flow from the latter but break with it.

In their most

developed form, they are attempts to undermine the entire
system of bourgeois production, and rest upon an understanding of that system which penetrates to its hidden

dynamic
The recognition of the products as its [wagelabour's] own, and the judgement that its separation from the conditions of its realization
is improper-- forcibly imposed--is an enormous
[advance in-ed.] awareness, itself the product
of the mode of production resting on capital,
and as much the knell to its doom as, with the
slave's awareness that he cannot be the pro perty of another with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence,
and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of
production
,

The stage of alienation which capital represents, then,
is

a

transitory one:
[The] process of inversion is a merely historical
for the development of the forces
necessity
of production solely from a specific historic debut in no way an absolute necessity
parture
of production; rather, a vanishing one
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The mature Marx explains the break-down of capitalist pro-

duction primarily in terms of its objective contradic-
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tions.

But he claims that such contradictions also ge-

nerate the conditions for revolutionary consciousness on
the part of the working-class.

Such revolutionary con-

sciousness foreshadows the triumph of self-conscious,
rational action over action determined by

production opaque to its participants.

a

system of

Grasping its real

relation to capital, the proletariat will destroy the
entire exploitative system of production and create

a

new

social order in which living labor has full control over
its own productive activity.

In this communist society,

Marx believes that actors will have

a

scientific relation

to nature and transparent relationships with one another.

They will determine and understand fully what they are
doing, and barring the fortuitous event, the consequences
of their actions always will mesh with their intentions.

There are enormous philosophical, to say nothing
of political, difficulties in a theory which entails a

concept of action as self-consciously determined by its
authors as the same time that it describes actual human

action as objectively determined and deeply mystified.
We have seen that in both his early and later writings,

Marx attempts to resolve these difficulties by locating
in historical time the disjuncture between the two types

of action.

He reads history not, of course, as a
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straightforward progression towards rational social action; but as the evolution of society from a
stage of

primitive communism or independent producer-ownership,
through the separation and inversion of subject and object under capitalism, to the redemptive unity of human

beings and nature in industrial communism.

It is quite

plain that this resolution has its philosophical support
in Hegelian idealism.

Marx's triadic vision of social

practice is the exact analogue of the Hegelian logic, in

which the immediate, unreflective unity of subject and
object is shattered as the subject undergoes separation
and alienation from itself, and by means of this very

separation reaches

a

conscious reason.

Hegel's tenet that separation is the

higher unity mediated by self-

necessary condition of self-conscious unity is echoed in
Marx's belief that the historical emergence of human beings as self -determining subjects is dependent upon the

economic and scientific advances made by capitalism.
That the destruction of primitive communism and the even
tual rise of capitalism are not contingent events, and

that the capitalist mode of production is determined by
the need which the fully rational communist man as impli

cit historical subject has for it, are but short next

theoretical steps.
take them.

It is never clear that Marx does not

His early description of communism bears the
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unfortunate marks of an historical conclusion, in which
laboring subjects as "united individuals" enjoy full

self-retrieval, complete rational control over the objec-

tification process, and total transparency in their social
relations.

The emergence of productive practice as ra-

tional, self-expressive and explicitly social, is the de-

noument of his mature theory of capital as well.

He de-

scribes the system of wage-labor and capital as "the last
form of servitude assumed by human activity ." ^'^

The so-

ciety which is to take its place is free of fundamental
tensions, both among human beings and betv;een humans and
It re-establishes the living laborer as the true

nature.

subject of production, whose work becomes "selfrealization, ob jectif ication of the subject, hence real
freedom."

25

In cooperation with other subjects, she or-

ganizes the labor process "rationally," according to a

"settled plan,

"

so that all subjects share equally in

labor and in the development of their "species capabilities."
One easily can understand how Marx, deeply com-

mitted to the liberation of the working-class, was tempted
to read history as a plot and the realization of freedom
as its ending

(or "real beginning").

But for a material-

Ideas,
ist who rejects the validity of trans-historical
fruit.
this is the temptation of strictly forbidden

Given
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his own assumptions about the nature of social practice,

Marx legitimately might argue that communist society will
overcome the worst problems of economic scarcity and the
physical and psychological miseries inherent in class
exploitation.

But the surfacing of new problems and

struggles is the one certainty
ist can predict.

a

dialectical material-

It cannot be guaranteed in advance,

furthermore, that these struggles will be "non-

antagonistic."

The Grundrisse and Capital no less than

the Manuscripts ignore the seeds of divisiveness and bru-

tality which lie elsewhere than in the production sphere.

Certainly a bitter struggle over the content of social
life itself is acutely possible once the production of

society is made a public and self-conscious affair.

We

might speculate that antagonisms in communist society

would emerge between administrative center and local
communities or workplaces; party leadership and rank and
file; male and female;

the pressure towards universalism

and ethnic identification.

These oppositions and others

unthinkable at present would generate new reasons for
opacity in social relations.

Their resolution in turn

might entail new standards of self-consciousness which
the given social order cannot fulfill.

Ironically, Marx's

optimistic rationalism (if the prospect of

a

fully har-

on this
monious society is cause for optimism) is founded
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curious combination: an idealist's vision of

a

final

"identity" of subject and object, and a materialist's
faith in the limited sources of social conflict.

CHAPTER

II

THE DETERMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The other side of Marx's vision of a future in

which action is fully transparent to its authors, is a
past and present in which action is fully opaque.

Perhaps

nowhere has Marx been more vulnerable to attack than in
his account of consciousness in general and mystified con-

sciousness in particular.

However, this account is both

more complex and more obscure than most of his critics

acknowledge.

First of all, Marx does not believe con-

sciousness to be an invalid hypothesis, or an unimportant
factor in social life.

Yet he never produces a sophis-

ticated, prolonged analysis of class consciousness to

match his mature analysis of the objective logic of capitalist production.

One thus is forced back to discus-

sions of mind one suspects are as cursory and blunted in

comparison to what he would have said had he explored the
subject in depth, as is his early analysis of capitalist

production in comparison to that in the Grundrisse and
Capital

.

Second, these discussions are cursory enough to

be congenial to many conflicting interpretations, and in-

consistent enough that each interpretation is open to
doubt.

And third, the interpretation most persuasive for
119

120

scholars today would not be compelling for audiences in

Marx's own time.

Modern readers tend to find in Marx's insistence
that all ideas are determined by material life, a posi-

tivism akin to that which forms the backdrop to their
own reflections.

However, Marx constructed his argument

with his own contemporaries in mind, and these contemporaries thought in ways grossly at odds with the beliefs
that only physically observable things are real, and only

physically observable facts susceptible to being known.
His claims about the relation of "thought" to "being" take

on a new meaning once one situates them against the fan-

tastical intellectual landscape of 19th century German
philosophy, and if one is to understand what he is saying,
one must appreciate the turns and emphases of his argu-

ment as they must have been appreciated by his own peers.

26

Although mechanistic materialism, that primitive
positivism, was by no means unheard of at the time,

27

the

German tradition which confronted Marx was so strongly
idealist that it had all but lost the connection between
thought and the embodied persons doing the thinking.
gel,

He-

the greatest of all idealists, created a vast philo-

sophical system around the logical and ontological pri-

ority of Abstract Thought.

But Marx reserved his sharpest

rebukes for the Young "left" Hegelians, who purported to

.
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abandon Hegel's metaphysic
practice.

in order to study real human

In fact, Marx charged,

they unwittingly con-

tinued to follow Hegel in treating social events as a

function of logically prior ideational ones, and history
as the maturation process of mind.

When mulling over so-

cial change, they talked only of emergent categories and

principles.

When investigating economic relations, they

spoke of the "bourgeoisie" as

a

logical form generating

bourgeois particulars out of itself.

They saw contradic-

tions in society in terms of contradictions between ab-

stract categories of "individuality" and "totality" which

ought to be reconciled so that reason might prevail in
social life.

In short,

the technique of these anti-

Hegelian critics came straight from Hegel: "An abstraction is made from

a

fact;

then it is declared that the

fact is based upon the abstraction.

That is how to pro-

ceed if you want to appear German, profound, and speculative

,,28

In what today is considered one of Marx's most

mechanistic works. The German Ideology

,

Marx and Engels

maliciously quote one critical philosopher, who is praising the accomplishments of two others:

Feuerbach destroyed the religious illusion, the
theoretical abstraction, the God-Man, while
Hess annihilates the political illusion, the abstraction of his wealth, of his activity; that
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is, annihilates wealth.
It was the work of Hess
which freed Man from the last of the forces ex.29
ternal to him
.

.

It was to counter such beliefs in the practical powers of

criticism, such confusions of putatively ideational phe-

nomena like God with phenomena existing apart from (although not independent of)

ideas about them like wealth,

and such abstractions of generic Man from human beings

living in concrete social and historical circumstances,
that Marx waged his theoretical battle against idealism.
It is,

in turn,

in the context of this battle that his

statements about consciousness must be set.

His first

and most general point--that consciousness is solely the

attribute of "real, living individuals,"
thing but "conscious existence"

31

30

that it is no-

--may seem true but

trite until one remembers the way in which German ideal-

ism severed the link between embodied human beings and
the ideas they have.

The care Marx takes here to root

mind in materially existing persons, so that consciousness
is always an attribute of humans

"living in a real, ob-

jective world and determined by that world,"

32

is an ob-

vious first sally against the view that ideas have a life

autonomous of human practice.
At the same time, the assertion that ideas are

determined by and explicable only in terms of practical
life raises several conceptual questions.

What exactly
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does Marx mean by "practical life," and what strength
does he mean to give to "determine?"

plicit answers here.

Marx gives no ex-

But we have seen

(see Chapter I)

that both in his early and later writings he views human

action as inherently purposive, and purposes as social
and historical.

If he is to be consistent with this con-

cept of action, he cannot take "practice" here to mean

patterns of human matter in motion.

Human practice must

be distinguishable from the mechanical movements of in-

animate objects and the instinctual behavior of other
animals, in that it expresses the actors' socially and

historically specific purposes and beliefs, although
these purposes and beliefs are not necessarily rational
in Marx's sense of the term.

And if practice is

a

com-

plex of thought and bodily movement, the determination of
ideas by practical life cannot be an instance of "deter-

mination" in the classical causal sense, where an effect
is separate in time and space from its cause.

Rather, it

must be that ideas are determined by and explicable in
terms of practical life because they are necessarily internal, and not logically prior, to it.

Conversely,

practice cannot be understood without reference to the
beliefs and intentions which inform it.

To recognize

that ideas are internal to practice rather than external
cause them.
to a set of purely physical movements which
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of course,

is only a preliminary though imperative step

in the explanation of ideas and the practices in which

they are embodied.

VJhy

various modes of thought and prac-

tice characterize a given form of social life, and why

new ideas and actions emerge out of old ones, are questions
still to be answered.
To understand a point which Marx will make against

critical philosophy, we must distinguish the ideas which

inform "everyday" practice from ideas about modes of
thought and practice (as well as about modes of instinctual and mechanical behavior)

,

or theory

.

Forming, sys-

tematizing, and articulating theoretical ideas is itself
a

practice, distinctive in that its entire point is the

construction of ideas.

This is not to say, of course,

that theorizing, like all thinking, is not accompanied by

physical changes in the brain, or that the objectification of theory does not involve the physical movements

necessary to speaking and writing.

Indeed, precisely be-

cause theorizing is a practice--in that its form is go-

verned by social rules and its content can be goven a
public, external reality--it is possible to theorize

about it.

Marx does exactly this (which is not to say

that he does it persuasively) when he remarks that the

demise of 17th century metaphysics can be explained by
represented
the emergence of French materialism, which
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matter as the sole substance of the world and ideas

a

mechanical motions, only if French materialism is explained by
the practical nature of French life at that time.
This life was turned to the immediate present,
to worldly enjoyment and worldly interests, to
the earthly world.
Its anti- theological
antimetaphysical, materialist practice demanded corresponding anti-theological, anti-metaphysical,
materialist theories. Metaphysics had in prac tice lost all credit.
,

Here it is obvious, first of all, that Marx includes in
the notion of practical life, ideas, norms and purposes:

specifically, worldly interests, values and wants informed that everyday actions of the French.

Second, Marx

believes French materialist theory to be rooted in everyday practical life, not as the set of ideas directly ex-

pressed in it, but as
the first.
a

a

second-order practice hinging on

Everyday practice, in other words, generates

theoretical practice which tallies with it and helps

justify it.
To combat the idea that theoretical practice of

itself transforms other practices, Marx draws

a

strict

line between "occurrences" in the realm of thought, in-

cluding theoretical and critical thought, and occurrences
in relations between objective beings.

He berates the

Young Hegelians for assuming that to undermine the principle or rationale of

a

practice through criticism is

ipso facto to destroy the actual practice.

"If society
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had to free itself only from the categories of having and
not having, how easy would the 'overcoming' and 'abolition'

of those categories

be.""^"^

But "property, capital,

money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of
the brain but very practical, very objective products
.

.

.

therefore they must be abolished in

objective way

..." 3 5

cient condition for

a

a

practical,

The necessary although not suffi-

thought-occurrence to become an

actual one, barring the fortuitous coincidence, is that
the thought be expressed in a relevant action, which en-

tails some bodily movement vis a vis other bodies in the
world.

Two points must be kept in mind.

First, Marx is

not saying that thought is irrelevant to practice, nor

critical thought to revolutionary practice.

But a trans-

formation of thought can have no impact on the world outside the thinker, if everyday practice goes on exactly
as before.

3

ft

Second, he is not claiming that phenomena

which are purely ideational (such as God, according to
Marx) will not disappear v/hen all thoughts of them do so.

However, he does imply that the philosophical critique
of a purely ideational or "pseudo" being

(a)

is not equi-

valent to the destruction of that idea in the minds of

other people;

(b)

is not equivalent to the practical de-

struction of the web of material accoutrements and prac(in the
tices which may have arisen to "service" the idea
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case of the idea of God: priests, churches, prayerbooks,
rituals, etc.); and

(c)

typically will not result in the

destruction of that idea in the minds of other people,
if the idea also is supported by everyday practices which

appear to have no connection to it.

The Young Hegelians

believed that "illusions of consciousness" to which humans ascribe an objective existence are the "real chains
of man."

37

Marx replies that these are only "phrases" of

the "real, existing world."

38

He seeks the ultimate ex-

planation of "mental phantoms" and the subsidiary practices which congeal around them, in a set of apparently

separate practices.

To the distinction between theoreti-

cal and everyday practice, then, we must add another:

within everyday practice,

distinction between religious

a

belief and practice on the one hand, and on the other,

practices whose own objects are not pseudo-beings but

which provoke the need for

a

belief in them.

Marx finds

the most significant of these latter practices to be

economic ones, and it is here that he will look for "real
chains."

39

upon a time an honest fellow had the idea
men were drowned in water only because they
If
possessed with the idea of gravity.
heads
their
of
out
idea
this
were to knock
they would be sublimely proof against any
danger from, water.

Once
that
were
they
.

.

.

Through this parody of the project of critical
philosophy, Marx neatly underlines the distinction betwen
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illusions of consciousness and objective constraints.

He

also teeters on the edge of a fundamental error which he

never is quite out of danger of making.

A natural object

does not change when we simply change our beliefs about
it,

because our ideas about the natural world do not en-

ter into its constitution.

The "objects" of the social

world, however, are practices and relations, which as we
have seen are made partly of the norms, ideas, and pur-

poses which hum.an actors express in them.
a

philosopher writing

a

Of course, if

paper at her desk undermines the

concept of authority-- the idea that there are some legitimate uses of power which some persons can wield over

others--this does not mean that actors will not respect
the authority of policemen or employers in their everyday

practice.

But if these actors themselves were to reject

the idea of authority, they would be proof against sub-

mitting to it.

And this is true because relations of

authority are constituted in part by the inter-subjective
belief among participants in those relations that some
uses of pov7er are legitimate and warrant submission.

How-

ever, beliefs and purposes do not entirely constitute so-

cial practice, which necessarily entails bodily movement
in the world of objects.

Two points follow which corres-

pond to Marx's complaint against the Young Hegelians.
First, the destruction of the idea of authority in every-
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day life does not mean that persons will not be forced
to submit to orders, although it does mean that those

orders will not be invested with a legitimacy which protects the position of the order-giver.

Second, actual

practices may serve to inhibit the destruction of the
idea of authority in everyday life.

Some of these prac-

tices directly express that idea (for example, relations

between employer and employee)

some directly support

,

that idea (education and socialization practices)
some indirectly support that idea.

,

and

To the set of prac-

tices which Marx asserts indirectly supports all the
ideas and practices comprising a form of social life, and
to the second stage of his argument against the idealist

theory of consciousness, we now must turn.
In The German Ideology

,

Marx declares with new

specificity that the material practice of real human beings holds the key to the explanation of their ideas and

indeed of their entire form of social life.

Marx uses

this critical term "material" in two related but not iden-

tical ways.

That something is material in the broader

sense of the term means that it is situated within and

belongs to the world of extended objects and their movements.

This first sense of "material" overlaps the con-

cept "practical life."

Every practice is

a

material one

reality (alin this sense, and ideas have no material
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though they have

a

reality as ideas) unless they can be

and until they are embodied in practice.

The explanatory

primacy of material practice in turn means that ideas are
not autonomous of or logically prior to practical life.

Depending on ones reading of Marx's concept of practice,
ideas either are caused by material practice which itself
is not expressive of ideas;

or are generated within and

circumscribed by material practice which itself is expressive of ideas.

Most of the time, however, Marx uses

the term "material" in a second, narrower sense, to refer
to the specific practices which pertain to the physical

life-process of human beings as inclusively natural,
bodily, historical and social creatures.

These fundamen-

tal practices of human life Marx identifies as: the pro-

duction of the means to satisfy the life-sustaining needs
of the body;

the production of new needs; the reproduction

of human beings; and the form of social cooperation in-

volved in these three activities.
even

a

What is evident from

cursory glance at these material practices is that,

while they pertain directly, although not exclusively, to
the physical sustenance of human life, they are not com-

prehensible simply as sets of physical movements.

That

purthe activity of material production is expressive of

poses, knowledge, and indeed the development of the human

intellect, is a fact Marx celebrates from the Manuscripts
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to Capital

.

The production of new needs, which marks the

advent of history and culture, refers directly to trans-

formations of consciousness, although these transformations do not occur in isolation from actual practice.
One perhaps can imagine reproduction to have been at some

point a simple instinctual act.
side of history,

But this point is out-

for Marx sees sexual activity as the

basis of the first social relation, and he believes that
social relations entail a reflexive consciousness on the

part of each participant:

a

concept of the self, the

other, and the relation between the two, and so the medi-

ation of language, thought, and culture.

"Where there

exists a relationship, it exists for me; the animal has
no 'relations' v;ith anything

..." 41

Reproductive rela-

tions in actual fact express some of the most complex

ideas and emotions of all:

42

affection, resentment, obli-

^
gation, guilt, respect, contempt--to name but a tew.
V.

X.

If ideas are internal to all social relations,

operation
a

— the

fourth aspect of material life

mechanical or instinctual phenomenon.

43

social co-

— cannot

be

And indeed, when

we speak of cooperation, we do not simply mean the combi-

nation of bodily movements, but also a set of beliefs and
purposes which persons have toward one another: ideas of
sympathy and trust, norms of authority, contract, or obligation, a knowledge of the purposes for which they are
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combining, and so on.

One must keep in mind the internal

connection of ideas to production and cooperation in particular when Marx states that "the 'history of humanity'

must always be studied and treated in relation to the
history of industry and exchange. "^^

It would be curious

if one were to take him to mean that the "history of hu-

manity" must be studied in relation to certain patterns
of physical movements in time and space.
be curious

rect)

It would not

(which is not to say that Marx would be cor-

to take him to mean that the history of human beings

and the host of practices in which they engage cannot be

understood apart from the history of one of the most fundamental thought-movement complexes of all: material pro-

duction

.

Whether or not Marx's own intentions were curious
is a more delicate question.

He is as unforthright here

about where or not he means to include forms of consciousness within "material praceice" as he was with the earlier

concept of practice per

se."^^

This lack of clarity, as

we shall see, complicates the question of the precise

connection between material production and politics, art,
morality, and all other components of what Hegel had
called "ethical life."

On one point Marx is quite clear:

material practice in its narrow sense is the key to the

explanation of the rest of any social whole.

Marx's
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hierarchy of significant subject-object relations is almost directly opposite to Hegel's, for whom the various
levels of ethical life, climaxing in art, religion, and

philosophy, not only mediate the lower levels but are
their truth or end.

For Marx, the most telling truth is

found in the way actual individuals "are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite material
limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of

their will."

46

Out of this primary level of practice

evolves, not as its telos but as its elaborations, politics, morality, art,

law, philosophy and religion.

What

Marx sees as the exact relationship between production
and other facets of social life is a more difficult question.

He states that legal and political relations do

not develop autonomously or as the result of the universal development of mind, but "have their roots" in the

material conditions of social life.
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The mode of pro-

duction "conditions" social structure, politics, etc.
The activities required for the physical sustenance of
life are the "base" of a social whole; politics, philo-

sophy and law its "superstructure."

48

Now, if "material

practice," "material production," and "base" connote only

patterns of behavior

,

Marx's distinction between material

production and politics et al

.

is one between patterns of

bodily movement and forms of consciousness, for he speaks
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of law, morality and so on most often as "principles."

The connection between material production and law, etc.,

given the explanatory primacy of the former, will be mechanical:

in some way, patterns of bodily movement which

produce food, shelter and clothing, emit relevant sets of
political, religious, and artistic ideas with which these

bodies "think."

If

"material production" instead connotes

bodily movements expressive of ideas, then the distinction

between production and politics et al

.

should be one be-

tween different kinds of thought-movement complexes, spe-

cifically between those directly concerned with sustaining
the life-process and those which are not.

The connection

between the two should be more intricate than
cal one.

a

mechani-

Political, religious, moral, and artistic prin-

ciples will be embedded in practices within

a

form of

life whose ultimate shape is determined not by the Idea
of Reason but by the practices necessary for the physi-

cal sustenance of life.

political et al

.

But because both productive and

practices are intentional and expressive

of beliefs and norms, these ideas not only must be ex-

plained by reference to the entire structure of practices
but also must help explain it.

Further, political, moral

and religious principles and practices will mediate the

fundamental material practices.

For while

a

given form

of life may delineate different spheres for different

practices, no society thus far in history has been able
to compartmentalize completely human experience.

So,

for

example, moral modes of thought and action (whose specific content depends upon the form of life in which they

occur) may inform the relations between husband and wife,
or between producer and controller of the means of pro-

duction

.

Although Marx never takes
issue.
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.

.

a

clear position on the

.

It IS in truth as difficult to imagine at least

politics, art, law and morality as pure thought, as it is
to imagine material production and reproduction as pure

matter.

The "products" of "ethical life" are not ma-

terial things capable of sustaining bodily needs.

But

except in the cases of philosophy and, according to Marx,
religion, where the defining relation is not between hu-

man and human or human and nature, but between human and
idea,

world.

they nonetheless entail bodily movement in the
One can do theory or be religious entirely in

ones head, although this is not usual.

But being poli-

tical, artistic, moral or lawful necessitates acting in
the world.

In contrast to material production, philosophy

and art, however, there are no products of politics and

morality beyond the practices of them.

CHAPTER

III

IDEOLOGY AND MYSTIFICATION

That "[t]he ruling ideas of each age have ever

been the ideas of its ruling class, "^^ and that these
ideas serve to mystify the social relations of production, complicates the question of the relation of ideas
to material existence.

Marx's earliest analysis of my-

stification describes it as

a

process whereby the ma-

terial conditions of an epoch are reflected in its domi-

nant ideas.

This analysis re-appears in the Preface to

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and
in Capital

.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
The ruling ideas are
the ruling ideas.
nothing more than the ideal expression of the
dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas.
.

.

.

To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain,
i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an
independent subject, is the demiurges of the
real" world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me,
on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than
the material world reflected by the human mind
^2
and translated into forms of thought.
If by "ideas" and "ideal" Marx means simply "ideas" or

consciousness per se

,

the sense of both passages is that

the ideas characteristic of a form of social life simply
136
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and mechanically reflect or picture the "raw-matter" of

that life, specifically

practice.

t:he

raw-matter of its productive

This sense is hi<)hly unsatisfactory, and not

only because, as Hegel pointed out long before, the only

thing the mind can reflect from raw-sense data are raw
and unspeakable sense-impressions.

More to the point, a

picture theory oF ideas cannot capture the distinction

between appearance and reality which the concept of mystification requires.
reality,

If minds were mirrors of material

they could never mis-understand it.

They would

draw from the simple fact of exploitative feudal productive practice, for example, the simple idea of exploitation, and not the dense web of beliefs concerning na-

tural hierarchy,

traditional rights and obligations, sin

and salvation, loyalty and chivalry, which helped to

mystify as well as constitute feudal social relations.
Further, if minds were mirrors of material reality, it

would make no sense to speak of practices which conceal
their own nature.

One could not, then, make a distinc-

tion between the surface of capitalist productive relations and their hidden reality.

However, one can interpret Marx's reflection

theory in

a

second way, if one takes him to be using the

term "ideal" as his idealist contemporaries most often
used it:

in the
to mean not merely subjective thoughts
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heads of individuals or intersub jective ideas marking

a

shared way of life, but also objective Ideas which manifest themselves through human practice.

The sense of the

passage is then that the ideas of the ruling class are
the characteristic ideas of every epoch, and these are

nothing more than the reification of dominant material

relations as universal truths or objective Ideas.

Every

ruling class, that is, idealizes (with degrees of complexity)

its modal forms of practice.

In a stable so-

cial order, all major classes will share these ideals.

This second interpretation has the advantage that it entails an appearance/reality distinction.

Reflection be-

comes a process by which consciousness transforms his-

torically limited social relations into universal, eternal or immanent truths.

This interpretation also does

not presuppose a mechanical separation of consciousness

from material reality, as it can accommodate the inter-

penetration of everyday beliefs and purposes, the productive practices they inform, and the idealization of those

practices as the embodiment of abstract justice, virtue,
natural law, or reason.

Marx's description of the pro-

cess by which a ruling class idealizes its interests confirms the interpenetration of beliefs, practices, and
ideals.

First, against an entrenched but increasingly

impotent dominant class, the new rising class's equation
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of its particular interests with the common interest
is

not inapt.

For a new rising class is symptomatic of an

emerging new world, in which the old dominant class and
its norms of action no longer have a definite place and

purpose.

In the context of the juncture between feudal-

ism and capitalism, when the feudal obligations of the

peasantry were no longer matched by those of the lord;
when the conditions of feudal social relations of pro-

duction were eroded by the impact of trade, the growth
of cities, the opening of new lands; and when the feudal

elite had lost all but its parasitical functions, how

untrue was the claim of "moveable property"
to have won political freedom for the people,
to have removed the chains which bound civil
society, to have linked together different world,
to have established commerce which promotes
friendship between peoples.
It has given
the people, in place of their crude wants, civilized needs and the means of satisfying them.

...

Second, the idealization of the interests of the dominant

class typically does not falsely describe (which is not
to say that it fully describes)

lations.

the content of social re-

The "characteristic misconception" of the rulinc

class is rather that it misplaces such relations, locating them outside the confines of history in an eternal

law of God, Nature, Reason, or Morality.

Third, the

ideals of the dominant class to a greater or lesser extent inform the beliefs and hence the actions of all ac-
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tors in society.

In this way ideology as idealization,

far from being a simple mental distortion of social prac-

tices and relations, is affirmed therein.
If in all ideology men and their circumstances
appear upside down as in a camera obscura this
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects
in the retina does from their physical life pro,

cess. ^4

It commonly is believed that this camera obscura

metaphor was Marx's crude attempt to improve upon the
reflection theory of everyday ideological consciousness.
The notion of ideology as

a

simple "inversion" of events

and relations in the objective world so little illuminates
the matter, that even Marx's most sympathetic critics

have rejected it.

But if one sets the passage against

its proper context, it is clear that Marx refers by "ide-

ology" not to the everyday understanding persons have of

their situation, but to the theoretical understanding

German philosophers (the "German ideologists") had of the

relationship between ideas and the world of embodied persons and practices.

His point is that if, to all ideal-

ists, embodied individuals and their practices appear as

the expression of objective Ideas and categories, this

inversion of the real relationship of ideas to human beings and social practices has its explanation in the his-

torical circumstances in which idealism arose.

It is

significant that the much maligned metaphor appears at

.
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the end of that passage in which Marx
had to insist a-

gainst the idealists, that real, existing human
beings
are the producers of their ideas and conceptions.

His

description of the method of "ideologists" is clearly
a
critique of the idealist method;
no less the method of
those deriving the "relationships of men" from the essence of man, than of those deriving the relationships of

men from the Absolute Spirit.

Lastly, he goes on to root

the inverted self-understanding of the idealists in the

division between mental and manual labor, which makes it
possible for consciousness to see itself as divorced from

practice and as floating in
theory.

a

realm of pure, universal

Marx's explanation of German idealism obviously

is an insufficient one, but his metaphor is not off the

mark
In a more general sense, the inversion of the re-

lationship between ideas and social practice is characteristic of any class society in which not actual historical classes, but rather their interests idealized as

universal truths, appear to govern social life.

In this

sense it is true that ideology as inversion informs

everyday beliefs about the world, but, as we have seen,
it is a complex inversion,

in which real class interests

are transformed into universal ideals, which then appear
as the subjects or authors of history.

Indeed, through-
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out his work Marx quite explicitly argues that
it is the

tendency of every dominant class to idealize its interests.

Each new rising class, he asserts in The German

Ideology

,

is forced "to represent its interest as the

common interest of all members of society, put in ideal
form;

it will give its ideas the form of universality,

and represent them as the only rational, universally

valid ones." 56

in The Poverty of Philosophy he describes

the categories of the bourgeois economists as the theore-

tical expression of historically limited relations of

production, represented as fixed, immutable, eternally
valid categories (of labor, credit, money, etc.).

57

In

The Communist Manifesto he notes that the ruling class

transforms "into eternal laws of nature and of reason,
the social forms springing from the present mode of pro-

duction and form of proper ty--historical relations that
rise and disappear in the progress of production."

Capital:

58

In

"The advance of capitalist production develops a

working-class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks
upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-

evident laws of nature."

59

The reading of "reflection" as "idealization"

avoids the pitfalls of mechanism, and it allows one to
look beneath the ruling se If -interpretations of an age

(whether they be of the sanctity of fealty or the natural
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origin of private property) to the material
relations of
production requiring, sustaining, and expressing them.
However, new conceptual dilemmas arise when Marx extends
the notion of reflection to refer not just to ideals,

but to politics, art, religion, etc., which he claims reflect in idealized form the reality of material production.

We have seen that Marx never was clear about whe-

ther politics, et_al. are only principles or also practices.

We have argued that politics et al

.

only make

sense as practices expressive of ideas, and that if ideas
are internal to practice, one set of practices never can
be explained solely in terms of another set rather than

also in its own terms--in terms of the purposes, beliefs
and norms which inform it.

Nor can an entire form of life

be explained without some reference to all the sets of

practices characterizing it.

But how can a given practice

have even limited explanatory power, if the ideas it ex-

presses are wholly

a

function of class relations in the

sphere of material production?

A theory which posits cer-

tain practices as ideological reflections of others
this case economic ones

validity:

(1)

— takes

— in

three steps of dubious

the distinction of practice into "moral

practice," "political practice," "artistic practice,"
etc., along with the assertion that only the practice of

material production can leave its mark on the rest.

This
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step rules out the interpenetration of various modes of

practice

— most

significantly, the penetration of pro-

ductive by other modes of practice.

motivation involved in

a

Thus the religious

particular economic decision,

the moral considerations informing or not informing an

employer's relationship with his employees, and the political impulse behind a change in industrial concentration, become incomprehensible except as guises for purely

economic considerations.

(2)

The reduction of the social

elaboration of norms, ideals, and values; the beliefs and
purposes they inform; and all practices other than those
directly concerned with material production, to mystified
forms of the relations and practices of the productive

process.

Thus legal, political, religious, aesthetic,

and philosophic forms become incomprehensible except as
forms in which human beings are conscious of and act in

response to the material conditions of production.
(3)

As an entailment of

(1)

and

(2)

,
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the denial that other

practices besides material production may be mystified on
their own account.
The flaws in this theoretical procedure become

evident when Marx seeks to understand religion.

It is

a trite fact that Feuerbach declared the idea of God to

be the fantastic alienation of the human essence, and

that Marx improved upon Feuerbach by looking for the

1
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causes of this alienation in human history.

scribes religion as an ideological practice

Marx de-

— in

fact, as

the most severely ideological of all superstructural

practices because its object is an imaginary one.
the young Marx, heaven is

a

For

"fantastic" reality which re-

flects the secular, historical world in two ways.

It

contains the historically specific desires, beliefs and
values of that world in fantastic form.

It also arises

out of an actual historical situation which requires il-

lusions of happiness and security to deflect attention

from real, socially created suffering and/or from the
fear inspired by an imperfect understanding of nature.

The key to religious consciousness, then, lies in the se-

cular rather than the theological world.

6

To the extent

that the explanation of the secular world lies in the

practices of material production, the explanation of religion will be found there too.
to Capital

,

From his early writings

Marx's view of the religious world as

a re-

flex of the real one remains basically the same, although
in Capital his analysis of the real world is more intri-

cate and precise.
Now,

if gods and spirits are purely fantastical

them for
or "pseudo" beings, one certainly cannot look to
practhe real explanation of religious or non-religious
tice.

unjustifiable
In this sense Marx is not making an

point when he describes religion as having its
roots in
secular practices.
But at the same time, and however
illusory their object, the religious beliefs of human
beings surely must enter into the explanation of religious
practice.

And it is neither logically impossible nor his-

torically inaccurate that these beliefs also may help explain certain facets of secular life, including material

productive practice.

For example, given his assumption

that God is an illusory being, Marx is correct in observing that the sabbath Jew cannot be understood without re-

ference to the everyday Jew.

(In a passage which reveals

an additional, quite insidious danger of reductionism,

Marx then defines the everyday Jew as the economic, commercial, money-making Jew.)
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However, it is certainly

the case that while the sabbath Jew cannot be understood

without reference to the everyday Jew, the sabbath Jew
also cannot be understood without reference to the sab-

bath Jew: without reference to the religious beliefs and
norms which inform her religious praceice.

Such beliefs

enjoy a complexity far richer than that which material

productive practice could sustain.

Indeed, even the eco-

nomic Jew cannot be understood without reference to the
sabbath Jew, for the economic role played by the Jews in

Europe from the feudal era onwards, was contingent upon
the simple peculiarity of their religious beliefs and
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practices within the larger Christian setting.

peculiarity the Jews could be identified as

a

By this

separate

group and subjected to special regulations restricting
rights to land and occupation.
Let us examine a second example of the interpene-

tration of religion and economic practice.

The Catholic

Church's prohibition of usury, effective until the 11th
century, helped preserve a social system in which the

Church had great political, social, and economic power.
Thus this religious norm had roots in very secular interests.

At the same time, however, one cannot account

for the medieval practice of loaning money without inter-

est unless one makes reference to the fact that most of
the population of feudal Europe, including the clergy

themselves, firmly believed it a sin to profit from an-

other's misfortune.
cal.

The idea of sin might be fantasti-

The belief in it was not.

In this way religion

mediated economic relations.
Marx is more often imprecise than reductionist
about the connections between various modes of human practice.

But at his most strident

— when

he declares that

politics, art, philosophy et al. are merely mystified

analogues of material production--he shows a blindness to
which Ilegel
the rich and intricate texture of social life
so finely understood.

He shows this blindness again when
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he paints his rather flat picture of a future conmunist

order.

In the Communist Manifesto

,

he states that the

form which class antagonism takes varies from one his-

torical epoch to the next, while exploitation per se has

remained

constant.

a

Similarly, the social conscious-

ness of past ages, while varying in content, "moves within certain common forms, or general ideas."

The pre-

cise content of such ideas--which Marx identifies as

morality, religion, philosophy, law, freedom and justice--

changes from one exploitative epoch to the next, but the
ideas themselves as general forms "cannot completely va-

nish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms."

64

meaning.
tice;

It is important to be quite clear about Marx's

He is arguing,

first of all, that freedom, jus-

the moral point of view; philosophical and aesthetic

truths, are not elements of a natural law but are social

constructs.

He is arguing, secondly and emphatically,

that these social constructs accrue only to exploitative

Hence they will

societies, whose relations they mystify.

disappear altogether with the advent of
ture.

a

classless fu-

"The Communist revolution is the most radical rup-

ture with traditional property relations; no wonder that
its development involves the most radical rupture with

traditional ideas. "^^

With this peculiar remark, Marx

discards for the future almost all the significant albeit
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class-permeated modes of social experience of the past,
with of course one critical exception.

The logical di-

lemma thereby introduced is not merely whether all thought
and action will be completely transparent after the com-

munist revolution, but whether there will be any thought
and action at all, beyond that concerning the production
of goods.

It is,

in fact,

tion should bring about

a

unthinkable that any revolucomplete rupture with all past

modes of thought, and unimaginable that it should bring
about a complete rupture with all past forms of action.
The concept of exploitation itself and some concept of

freedom, for

a

start, certainly must have a place in po-

litical discourse on both sides of the divide, for else

what meaning would a non-exploitative society have for
those who struggled to bring it into existence?
that a revolution marks

a

To state

conceptual and practical trans-

formation of, rather than break with, the past, is not to
say that certain modes of thought and action will not dis-

appear altogether.

If one accepts Marx's analysis of God

as the fantastical reflection of human beings, for ex-

ample, one can imagine religion dissolving in its en-

tirety, although at a pace far slower than the term "rupture" implies.

On the other hand, one can also imagine

the re-appearance of religion with the emergence of new

antagonisms among human beings and between humans and
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nature.

It is almost but not entirely beyond
the scope

of the imagination that under certain,
anarchistic forms
of communism, formal law would disappear.
But one would

have a hard time identifying a socialist
society as a
society at all, if in addition to a transformed

set of

productive relations, it did not incorporate some transformed concept of freedom; some notion of the moral point
of view;

some experience of art and beauty; some musings

on the meanings of human existence; and lastly some poli-

tical intercourse between social individuals concerning

their common affairs.
The idea of a rupture between a flat future and a

complex

if

ideological past, appears again in Marx's

claim that all consciousness is class consciousness.

By

this Marx does not mean that there cannot be a disjuncture

between ones own class position and ones ideas and interests.

In the Communist Manifesto

,

for example, he

notes that historically, "a small section of the ruling
class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary
class; "^^ that the falling lower middle class may become

revolutionary, deserting "their own standpoint" to defend
"not their present, but their future interests;"
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and

that the proletarian may be joined in their revolution
by "a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have

raised themselves to the level of understanding theore-
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tically the historical movement as

a whole. "^^

But while

there can be a disjuncture between ones particular class

position and ones particular class consciousness, there
cannot be
se.

a

disjuncture between class and consciousness per

Given Marx's equation of consciousness with class con-

sciousness, and his reduction of all political, religious,

moral and aesthetic notions and practices to mere mystifications of exploitative productive relations, it is difficult to imagine what consciousness will look like after

classes and exploitation disappear.

The three logical pos-

sibilities Marx leaves open are all unpalatable.

That the

revolution will bring the end of all consciousness is patently ludicrous; that it

v;ill

bring the end of all con-

sciousness except that about the nuts and bolts of material
production, highly distasteful; and that it will bring
about the demise of the ideological mind and the creation
of the unideological one,

literally incomprehensible.

The idealization of the social relations of pro-

duction, which infects both thought and practice, is a

critical part of the dynamic of mystification.

But the

mystification of capitalist social relations is distinguished from its feudal predessor by an additional turn
of the screw.
lived
The fact that the lord of a feudal manor
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off the labor of others was evident
to lord and serf
alike; "every serf knows that what
he expends in the service of his lord, is a definite quantity
of his own personal labour-power."^^ The mystification
of the exploitation of the serf consisted in its justification,
not

merely by

a set of

beliefs and values supporting the re-

lationship of landowner to tenant (beliefs in natural
hierarchy, organic social ties, differential rights and

obligations; values of obedience, loyalty and honor), but
by the entire layered complex of practices and relations

comprising feudal society.

The relationship of nobleman

to king, petty lord to great, knight to lord, replicated

and thereby legitimized the ties of unequal personal de-

pendence which so explicitly marked the social relations
of production on the lord's estate.

As Marx put it,

"per-

sonal dependence form[ed] the groundwork of society,"

7n

and so concealment of exploitation was unnecessary.

What

the hierarchical whole of medieval life did obscure, were
the purely social origin of the unequal rights and duties

linking its members in relations of superiority and subordination, and the crucial economic stake which the
feudal elite had in the stability of those relations.
In the Second Manuscript

,

Marx describes how the

feudal lord conceals from himself his economic interests
and represents the social relations which protect those

.
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interests in purely moral, political, and religious
terms.
The capitalist, on the contrary, freely admits his
economic motivations and idealizes in moral, political, and

religious terms the social relations which are their result.

Of the clash between the two, the landowner

emphasizes the noble lineage of his property,
feudal souvenirs, reminiscences
his openhearted character, his political importance, etc.
he portrays his opponent as a sly, bargaining, deceitful, mercenary
soulless individual
without honor, principle, poetry
who is alienated from the community which
he freely trades away, and who breeds, nourishes
and cherishes competition and along with it poverty, crime and the dissolution of all social
bonds
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The capitalist in return

pities his opponent as a simpleton, ignorant of
[his] own nature (and this is entirely true) who
wishes to replace moral capital and free labor by
crude, immoral coercion and serfdom ... a Don
Quixote who, beneath the appearance of directness, decency, the general interest and stability,
conceals his incapacity for development, greedy
self-indulgence, selfishness, sectional interest,
and evil intention.
That the triumph of "overt baseness" over "con-

cealed baseness" was also the triumph of concealed ex-

ploitation over overt exploitation, Marx fully understood
only years later.

It is in Capital that he exposes the

double nature of the mystification of capitalist social

realtions of production: the concealment of the real, ex-

ploitative relations, and the idealization of the apparent, non-exploitative relations of production.

The my-

stification of the apparent social relations of production,

like its feudal counterpart, originates as a dy-

namic of the self-understanding of an age.

The charac-

teristic forms of these relations are transformed into

universally valid norms and truths which in turn to

a

greater or lesser degree inform the beliefs and practices
of both capitalist and wage-laborer.

The mystification

of the real social relations of production by concealment,

which has no feudal counterpart, originates as

a

dynamic

of the organization of capitalist production itself.

It

is intrinsic to the mode of capitalist production that

the social relations of production show themselves as

that which they are not: as non-exploitative relations
This appearance is

between equal, independent agents.
not an illusion of the mind.

Rather, it comprises the

real surface of capitalist productive relations: the

sphere of circulation and exchange.

Marx's imagery of

an essence which puts itself forth as appearance, both

sides of which are real and necessary parts of a whole,
is evocative of Hegel's analysis of "essence" as the se-

cond category of the Logic

.

One

(but not the only)

cru-

cial difference is that according to Marx the apparent

relations of capitalist production do not directly exfunction of)
press, but both express (in that they are a
and conceal

(in that they are the

"opposite" of) their

.

inner workings

What exactly is the form the relations of
capitalist production take in the sphere of
circulation? Capitalist and wage-laborer face each other in the
marketplace as independent property-owners, the capitalist
the

owner of capital and the laborer of labor-power, who are
free to enter into contractual relations with each other.

The capitalist pays the worker the full value of his

labor-power in exchange for the right to use it as the

capitalist sees fit.

Exchange relations hence are rela-

tions of freedom, interpreted as the ability to do what
one wants without interference, and equality, interpreted
as the ability to receive full value for what one ex-

changes on the market.

And just at the dependent and un-

equal productive relations of feudalism were idealized

through a morality of traditionally sanctified, unequal
rights and obligations, the apparent productive relations
of capitalism are idealized through a morality of natural

right, in which persons are seen and treated ad indepen-

dent and equal individuals with inherent rights to free-

dom and private property.

Legal relations in the same

way express in the ideal form of justice these apparent
social relations.

The contractual relation, in which

owners of commodities "mutually recognize in each other
the rights or private proprietors," is a juridical rela-
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tion "between two wills, and is but the reflex of the
real economic relation between the two."^^
It is by means of a "fetishism of commodities"

that the free and equal relations of the sphere of cir-

culation-- that "very Eden of the innate rights of man""^^

—

obscure in two ways the reality of the productive sphere.
(1)

The commodity- form of goods produced for exchange con-

ceals the social nature of labor and the social origin of
value.

Relations between individual producers are medi-

ated by "relations" between their inanimate products,

which appear to exchange with each other according to some
inherent, objective value in each commodity.

The rela-

tions between their products takes place independently of
the will of the producers, and this fact is not affected
by the discovery, which only "removes all appearance of

mere accidentali ty from the determination of the magnitude of the value of products,"

nant of value is labor-time.

75

that the real determi-

For as long as production

takes the form of the private production of goods for

exchange, the producers will continue to be dependent
for the satisfaction of their needs upon the activities
of their products in the marketplace.

The control which

relations bethe relations between products have over the
times of ecotween producers is particularly evident in
rather than
nomic crises, when exchange relations prohibit

provide the medium for the fulfillment of
needs.

(2)

The

commodity-form of labor-power and capital conceals
the
exploitative relationship between capitalist and wagelaborer.

First, the equal exchange of value for value-

specifically, of capital in the form of wages for the full
value of labor-power

— obscures

the appropriation by the

capitalist of surplus-labor from the worker, for which
the latter receives nothing in exchange.

This appropri-

ation is possible because the worker creates more than
his own value in a day's work.

Thus while he receives in

wages the equivalent of the full value of his labor-power,
he receives in wages the equivalent of only a part of the

total value he creates.

Second, the exchange of commo-

dities as private property masks the fact that the capital

exchanged for labor-power is itself dead labor or "congealed labor time."

Capital appears as an animate pro-

perty of the capitalist which has the magical powers of

activity and self-enlargement.

Inversely, the animate

power of the worker to objectify his purposes in nature
appears as

a

thing which he can alienate from himself.

The ultimate consequence of this alienation is the en-

hancement of capital.

Third, the freedom of exchange be-

tween capitalist and wage-laborer hides the fact that "behind the factory door" the worker is forced to produce

more than his own value in order to receive his value in

.
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wages
In the market he stood as owner of the commodity,
"labour-power," face to face with the other owners
of commodities, dealer against dealer.
The contract by which he sold to the capitalist his
labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white
that he disposed of himself freely.
The bargain
concluded, it is discovered that he was no "free
agent," that the time for which he is free to sell
his labour-power is the time for which he was
.76
forced to sell it
.

In sum,

.

the sphere of circulation and exchange is

the key to the mystification of capitalist productive re-

lations.

First,

the social relations of production as

they appear in this sphere--as relations of freedom and

equality between owners of commodities

— are

idealized in

morality, law, religion, which in turn support the orgaSecond, the appearance of social

nization of production.

relations of production in the sphere of circulation conceals by means of commodity fetishism the inner reality
of the social nature of labor, the social determination
of value, the forced appropriation of surplus-labor from

the worker by the capitalist, and the activity of labor
as the secret of capital.

For two distinct reasons, it cannot be said that
relations is
the mystification of exploitative productive
of
simply a matter of false ideas which persons have

their real situation.

First, ideology as the idealization

successfully myof historically limited social relations
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stifies those relations only to the extent that it
informs
the beliefs and hence the actions of the participants.

Persons do not move about in the world without ideas and
then think about the world in idealized terms.

The in-

tention, "this is what is due by right to the lord," is

internal to the action of the obedient serf who weaves
her cloth.

Indeed, her weaving for the lord cannot be

understood apart from this intention, although the latter
is not a sufficient explanation of the former.

Second,

and peculiar to the case of capitalism, the mystification

through concealment of the inner reality of production
occurs by means of a set of real practices and relations.
Such practical mystification, of course, is as little di-

vorced from beliefs and purposes as is practice in general.

Not only are beliefs about their free and equal

status expressed in the interactions of commodity-owners
in the marketplace, but through commodity fetishism the

idea of "a day's work for a day's pay" informs the acti-

vity of the laborer in the factory.
That mystification, whether as idealization or

concealment, is not a simple distortion of the real,

practical world but helps comprise it, complicates the
study of ideology in class society and exacerbates the

difficulties of transforming that society through popular
revolution.

Both student and revolutionary face a situa-

.
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tion in which persons engage in an entire complex of

practices expressing beliefs and purposes for which, consequently, "false" is too crude

a

term.

however not to overstate the case.

It is important

While the idealiza-

tion of productive relations infects the beliefs, pur-

poses and actions of participants in those relations,
and while beliefs and purposes enter into the practices

concealing the inner reality of capitalist production;
it would be odd to assert that consciousness in class so-

ciety is never more than ideological consciousness, and

practice never more than the expression of ideological
ideas.

This is not just because theoretical room must be

left for the possibility of critical thought and revolu-

tionary action.

More fundamentally, one otherwise could

not explain the prosaic doubts, resentments, suspicions
and hostile actions of persons who yet do not fully un-

derstand and/or do not revolt in an overt or systematic
way
A categorical denial of agency and hence dignity
to the inhabitants of past and present devalues popular

activity in a way that capital itself has never done.
also removes historical support from

a

It

future in which,

according to Marx, human agency and dignity are to bear
their richest fruit.

This is not to say, of course, that

that a future
such a devaluation is thereby incorrect, or
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of more complete human agency in fact has historical sup-

port.

But only the gravest of consequences lie in wait

for a politics which attempts to wrench free and rational

social relations out of relations it believes to be

thoroughly coerced and mystified.

CHAPTER

IV

THE METHOD
The word must often used to describe Marx's me-

thod is, of course,

"materialist."

That there is no ideal

reality beneath or prior to social practice, and that the

most significant practices of all have to do with the production of goods for the physical maintenance of life, are
the essential premises of Marx's study of bourgeois eco-

nomy and his search for its explanation inside the boun-

daries of the social world.

Nevertheless, his investi-

gation proceeds along lines one could not call "materialist" in any simple sense of the term.

For when he looks

at the productive process, he does not see patterns of

material behavior, but

a

complex of social relations which

have a brute-physical dimension but also entail non-

material meanings, beliefs, and purposes.

And when he

explains the capital-wage labor relation, he does so not
in terms of external material causes, nor for that matter

in terms of the beliefs and purposes of its participants,

but rather by reference to an inner, abstract, objective
logic.

Marx's method has empirical, interpretive, and

structural components.

But it is the third, least "ma-

terialist" component which lends the method its greatest
162
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power, and its gravest weakness.

His analysis of an inner

logic of capital allows him to lay bare
the secret of

capitalist development.

it also brings him dangerously

close to that final border dividing
theory from

a

a

materialist social

theory which explains social life as de-

termined by an objective Idea.
Marx begins his journey to the heart of bourgeois

society in the way he believes every "genuine materialist"
must: by examining its actual practices, and by examining
its productive rather than religious, political, or artis-

tic practices.

He does not, however, conduct this exami-

nation along strictly empiricist lines.

He understands

the labor process to be inherently purposive, and although

the particular purposes the laboring subject embodies in
the object do not "show" on the physique of either, they

help constitute the identity of both.

As the intentions

and interests which inform productive practice change over
the course of history, what the intentional subject is,

and what the intended object is, change as well.
fond of saying (although not in these words)

Marx is

that the ob-

ject of labor is a text in which one can read the progress
of the human intellect.
to this text.

Empirical observation is blind

It can grasp neither the meanings which

help constitute the subject and object of labor, nor the

dynamism which the "unceasing sensuous labour and crea-
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lend the natural and social world.

Empirical ob-

servation equally is unable to capture the
relations between human beings engaged in the labor process.
Rela-

tions per se, Marx reminds us, cannot be sensed,
but "can
be established as existing only be being thought. ""^^

More germaine, specifically social relations are not reducible to sense-data, because they entail

a

shared field

of meanings within which participants conceive of them-

selves, their relations to the natural world, and their

relations to one another.

These meanings can be inter-

preted; they cannot be observed.

When Marx looks at the

relations between persons in productive practice, then,
he does not see simply material beings in physical rela-

tions to one another.

Nor, however, does he see inten-

tional individuals acting in accordance with the dictates
of their private reasons.

Rather, he sees participants

whose particular beliefs, interests and ends are

a func-

tion of the specific relations in which they stand towards
one another as they engage in productive activity.

It is

symptomatic of the complexity of Marx's vision, that when
he looks at the object of labor, he also sees

marily not as

a

material thing with

a

it pri-

purpose or use, but

as a symbolic expression of the social relations under which

it was produced:

symbolic because these social relations

can be neither directly observed in, nor inferred from.
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the object's

i)hy.sic<il

form.

Thus Marx states that the

object of labor under caf.ital is both

a

material product,

and a symbol of the labor-time necessary for
its prodvic-

tion and the relation between waqe-laborer and capital

which that production entails.

As a symbol or value,

"not an atom of matter enters into its composition."^'"^

Exactly because the commodity expresses another reality
besides that of its physical being and use, Marx can make
it the central category through wliieh he will unpack the

whole of ca[)italist social relations.
Marx,

then, examines the real world of production

as a complex of meaning-laden social relations, purposive

actions, and objects expressive of both.

However, he does

not look for the explanation of capitalist production in
the shared purposes and meanings of its human partici-

pants.

To the contrary, he finds a systematic dis junc-

ture between the appearance and the reality of the

capital-wage labor relation, v/hich challenges not merely
the evidence of (he senses, but more critically the way

participants understand what they are doing and why they
are doing it.

Tliis

dis Juncture also calls into question

the theoretical reflections of their "scientific represen-

tatives," who,
tent to take,

i;n(iels

remarks,

"generally have been con-

just as they were?,

the terms of commercial

and industrial life, and to operate with them."

80

Or,

to
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put it as Marx does, they "are unable to separate the
form
of appearance from the thing that appears. "^^

It is tell-

ing of Marx's posture towards interpretive methodology
on
the one side and empiricist methodology on the other, that
he does not discard the categories which capitalist so-

ciety uses to understand itself "in order to look at the
facts as they really are."

Marx quite explicitly begins

his analysis of capital on the basis of the categories of

bourgeois political economy

— that

is,

from within a lan-

guage which mystifies the capital-wage labor relation.
He does so because he sees this mystification as a func-

tion of the capitalist mode of production itself.

To un-

ravel the way in which each economic category obscures the

capital-wage labor relation, is at once to make that relation transparent and to grasp how it "puts itself forth"
in opaque form.

The category at the center of Marx's

attention is the coiranodity.

82

We have seen that he is

interested not in the commodity as a physical thing, but
in its "second existence" as a \7alue or symbol of social

production relations.

He argues that the commodity as

value symbolizes these social relations only in opaque
form.

Value, a function of the labor time necessary for

the commodity's production, appears in the commodity as

exchange value, a quantitative relation between material
objects themselves.

This opaque appearance of value sup-

167

presses the division of the labor-time embodied in the

commodity into necessary and surplus labor-time.

Because

the commodity as exchange value is a deceptive symbolic

form which helps obscure capital's exploitation of wagelabor, Marx calls it a "hieroglyphic" of capitalist rela-

tions.

Money is

a yet

more complex hieroglyphic, for

here exchange value is detached from the particular com-

modity and appears as an independent metallic existence
found in nature.
is

Of course,

it is money as capital which

the target of Marx's investigations.

He will show how

an apparently sel f -generative material thing, is in truth
a social relation between objectified and living labor.

Marx drav;s out the depth meanings

,

hidden from

bourgeois society itself, of the concepts of the commodity, money, exchange value, capital, private property,
and so on.

He thus works downwards from the appearance

of capital as natural and just, to its reality as exploi-

tative of wage-labor.

And by describing the real dynamic

of this exploitative social relation, he works outwards
to the historical boundaries of what had appeared to be
a fixed mode of production and an eternally valid concep-

tual framework.

In sum,

he undermines the self-image of

bourgeois society from within the set of concepts with

which it understands itself.

One happy consequence is

participants
that he maintains a conceptual link with the
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in capitalist social life, who are not prohibited
from

comprehending his theory and making critical judgement
upon it.
If,

in the end, Marx does not find the explana-

tion of bourgeois social relations in the meanings and

purposes of its participants, where does he find it?

His

explanatory method is this: he abstracts from the actual,
"concrete" world of capital to its inner logical struc ture

.

tice.

Here he locates the secret of real productive pracIn the Grundrisse

,

when Marx speaks of the abstract

structure as opposed to the actual social practice of
capital, he uses the term "the concept of capital."

Thus

he states that limits to capitalist production are founded

in "the essential character of its very concept;"

8 3

that

the division of the product into parts corresponding to

raw material necessary labor, and surplus labor is "in-

herent in the concept of capital;"

QA
*

that "It belongs to

the concept of capital that the increased productive force
of labor is posited rather as the increase of a force

outside itself, "^^ and so on.
then,

The concept of capital,

includes all the internal implications of the

capital-wage labor relation: it describes the internal coherence and dynamic of a set of social relations stripped
of the rich but confusing texture of actual life.

Re-

marking in Capital that he will treat capital accumulation
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"in the abstract," Marx explains that he will disregard

"all phenomena that hide the play of its inner mecha-

nism."

86

He thus ignores the possibility that goods will

be sold above their value, or that surplus value will be

divided among capitalists, landowners, and banks, or, for
that matter, that capitalists will give ever larger pro-

portions of their personal consumption fund to their psychiatrists, or

.

.

.

but one could go on and on, for these

elaborations are what makes life life and not logic.

It

is perhaps impossible for Marx to define the precise ex-

tent to which the logic of capital determines the real
life of capitalist society.

That there is an extent to

which it does not, he readily admits when he comments that
the logic will be much modified by the play of actual cir-

cumstances.

But his basic claim stands: it is in this lo-

gic that the explanation of capital lies.

With his notion of an objective abstract structure
of production, Marx makes his last, irrevocable break

with the empiricists.

He also assumes a complex stance

towards interpretive theory.

He is attentive in studying

the beliefs which inform capitalist social relations.

those
However, he studies them not as an explanation of
obrelations, but as clues which at once point to and

scure an explanation located elsewhere.

In truth, his

in an objecmature method of seeking social explanation
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tive, abstract logic,

is

profoundly Hegelian.

His most

difficult task, in consequence, will be to exploit
the
power of Hegel's logic without succumbing to
Hegel's vision of society as expressive of an abstract Idea.
To distance himself from Absolute Idealism, Marx

makes three important distinctions between his method of

abstraction and Hegel's own.

First, he insists that theo-

retical abstractions always are abstractions from

cially and historically specific reality.
versal concepts have no real content.
he declares,

a so-

So-called uni-

It is impossible,

to deduce the content of a particular social

division of labor from "the single word divide, from the
idea,

the category."

87

finition of property as

Likewise, "to try to give a de-

...

an abstract and eternal

idea, can be nothing but an illusion of metaphysics."

88

From the early writings on, Marx believes that the validity of theoretical categories is

contingent upon

a

par-

ticular, historically limited set of social practices.

Secondly, he asserts against Hegel that there is no ne-

cessary correlation between the logical priority of analytic categories and the historical sequence in which social relations arise.

The logical priority of analytic

categories is determined solely by the set of relations

which predominate in the social whole.

"
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In all forms of society there is one
specific
kind of production which predominates over the
rest, whole relations thus assign rank and influence to the others.
it is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and mo-

difies their particularity ^9
.

Thus, although rent and landed property appear histori-

cally before capital.

Capital is the all dominant economic power of
bourgeois society.
It most form the startingpoint as well as the finishing-point, and must
be dealt with before landed property. ^0

Marx likewise carefully distinguishes the abstract concept of capital from its real historical development.
The conditions under which primitive accumulation oc-

curs are part of the historical formation, but not of the

developed system, of capitalist production.

When capital

has supplanted the external conditions of its origin with
the exploitation of wage-labor, it "proceeds from itself
to create the conditions of its maintenance and growth,"

and its internal dynamic provides its explanation.

For

this reason, to comprehend the capital-wage labor relation,

"it is not necessary to write the real history of

the relations of production

92
.

Third and most important, Marx asserts that the

movement from abstract concept to the concrete, living
whole is only a method by which the scientist seeks to

comprehend the concrete.
[T]he method of rising from the abstract to the
concrete is only the way in which thought appro-

9

.
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priates the concrete. ... But this is by no means
the process by which the concrete itself comes into
being.
For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g., exchange value, presupposes
an already given, concrete, living whole.
The real subject retains its autonomous existence
outside the head just as before; namely as long
as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely
theoretical
.

.

.

.

.

.

The abstract concept of capital does not have ontological

priority over the concrete world of capital.

That con-

cept is not the "first cause" of the living world, nor
its "true reality."

Both the authorship and real content

of concrete social life lie in human activity bounded by
a

set of natural limitations.

Marx still insists, how-

ever, that participants in capitalist society act accord-

ing to a logic of which they are unaware, and which de-

termines their productive practice.

He thus stands on

the razor's edge of a determinist theory of capital which
is not,

ironically, materialist but idealist.

In fact,

he is able to come just short of proposing that social

practice has an ideal cause.

How does he do so?

The

answer lies in his peculiar distinction between appearance
and reality.

Unlike Hegel, Marx does not see the actual,

concrete world as the phenomenal (which is not to say
"illusory") appearance of an inner, ideal reality.

In-

stead of equating appearance with concrete social life
and reality with its inner logic, he roots the appearance/
capireality distinction within the logical structure of
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tal itself.
a

In other words, capital is characterized by

structural duplicity: it is "part of its concept" that

it appears other than it is.

The actual participants in

bourgeois society experience the real, concrete marketplace and the real, concrete factory in terms of the ap-

parent structure of capital, which masks the exploitation

entailed by the hidden structure.
is this:

The curious consequence

the participants are blind to the logic of the

capital-wage labor relation, even though this logic is but
the expression of their own actions

.

Humans author the

dyanmic of the relation without knowing that they do so,
and because that dynamic is deceptive, they act without

knowing why they do what they do.

Their action is not

the less determined for being subject to no cause beyond

itself.

For Hegel, on the contrary, human actors do not

produce a logic of which they are unaware, but only express such a logic in their practices, for they are not in
the ultimate sense authors at all.

Marx, then, articulates the abstract logic of

capital alone in terms strongly reminiscent of Hegel's

articulation of the relationship between the abstract
Idea and its concrete, phenomenal expression.

He de-

scribes capital as a totality whose abstract structure is

divided into surface and depth, alienated and inverted
own
object and subject; and which moves according to its
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internal and eventually self-destructive dynamic.
In the introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx

sketches the following argument: that the apparently separate, independent spheres or "totalities" of production
proper, exchange, distribution and consumption are in

truth internal "moments" of

a

larger whole.

Thus their

relations are not external and contingent, but internal
to and required by the whole of a productive process.

This whole is internally structured.

Its predominant mo-

ment is production proper: "A definite production

.

.

.

determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these dif ferent moments."

94

In turn,

a

set of internal, struc-

tured relations holds between the dominant mode of pro-

duction in a given society and the remnants and beginnings of other modes.

It is not,

for example, as an ex-

ternal, separate cause that capital affects agrarian and

money-lending activities inherited from

a feudal past.

Rather, commodity relations re-constitute

these activi-

ties, so that they become fundamentally different actions

from what they had been before.

The one looses its pa-

ternalistic character, and other its moral stigma, as both
are "bathed in capital's general illumination."
In the actual text of the Grundrisse

,

Marx refers

whose development
to capital as "organic," a "totality,"

|i

I

.
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"consists precisely in subordinating all
elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it
the organs
which it still lacks;" and in which each economic
relation

presupposes every other "in its bourgeois economic
form." 9 5

The developed system of capital, then, is a to-

tality of internally related, ordered parts which moves

according to its own internal dynamic.

The "laws of capi-

tal," in consequence, are not descriptions of contingent,

mechanical relationships between discrete phenomena.
These objective laws instead are analytic: they describe
the inner relations which constitute capital and the inner

movement by which capital transforms and finally suspends
itself
The process of capitalist production is struc-

tured along two axes.

surface and depth.
risse

,

The first is the vertical axis of

Marx uncovers this axis in the Grund -

but it is familiar to most readers because of its

central place in Capital

.

The vertical structure of capi-

tal is comprised of two moments: the moment of circula-

tion and exchange, and the moment of the actual produc-

tion of commodities.

While these two moments appear as

separate and independent processes, exchange in truth is
the surface of a larger process through which commodi-

ties created in the sphere of production are transformed

into money

(the first act of exchange)

and money is ex-
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changed for the subjective and objective conditions of

production (the second act).

These conditions "disap-

pear" from exchange into the sphere of production, where

capital is created in the form of commodities, and appear

again in the sphere of circulation, where capital is re-

alized in the pure form of value, money.

The whole of

capital's productive process encompasses both moments, so
that the independence of exchange from production is

a

"mere semblance." The second way in which capital is in-

ternally structured is into subject and object.

Not sur-

prisingly, the notion of this horizontal self -distinction
of capital appears very early in Marx's writings.

Holy Family

,

In The

he describes the "world of private property"

antithetical moments are wealth

as a whole whose internal,

and the proletariat.
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•

Wealth is private property in its
•

positive, "self-satisfied" form: it seeks to maintain its

relation with its opposite.

The proletariat is private

property in its negative, debased form: it seeks to destroy that relation.

This subject/object distinction be-

comes the central motif of the Grundrisse

.

Here Marx

sees the totality of capital as the unity of alienated
of laand inverted opposites: the subjective conditions

conditions
bor (living labor capacity) and the objective
of labor

(raw materials,

subsistence)

.

instruments of labor, means of

These opposites appear as autonomous
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agents— wage-labor and capitalist— who enter into relation with one another through the capitalist's
exchange
of wages for the use of living labor capacity,
ity, however,

in real-

there is not one atom of a distinct, autono-

mous thing called capital.

The capital which confronts

wage-labor in the sphere of exchange as the objective conditions of labor, and exchanges with wage-labor as wages,
is in truth the surplus value created by labor

mg

source of value" 98

)

("the liv-

in the sphere of production and

appropriated by the capitalist without exchange.

The

wage-form, in which the value of living labor capacity

appears as the value of the labor embodied in

a

day's

work, only serves to obscure "the division of the working-

day into necessary and surplus-labour, into paid and un-

paid labour."

99

The laborer creates the value which ex-

ploits him as capital, and this exploitation is magnified at the close of each productive cycle.

Thus the re-

lation between labor and capital in truth is the relation

between labor-capacity in the form of subject or living
laborer, and labor-capacity which already has been objectified.

It is an alienated and inverted relation, be-

cause objectified labor assumes an autonomous existence

vis-a-vis the living laborer, and expands through its in-

corporation of living labor capacity.

Thus, at the same

time that there is no capital which is not in truth ob-
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jectified labor, there is no wage-labor which
is truly
autonomous of capital.
Living labor becomes a mere moment of capital as a whole, the necessary means
to its

multiplication.

This is true not only after the particu-

lar act of exchange between wage-labor and capital.

very act of exchange presupposes

a

The

prior separation of

living labor and its objective conditions, and the incor-

poration of the former as
the latter.

a

subordinate constituent of

For otherwise, the laborer would not have to

sell its labor-power to transform the objective world,
and there would be no alien capital to buy it.
To sum up, the capital-wage labor distinction is

one internal to capital; but the apparently opposite sub-

jective and objective moments of capital are both in truth

entirely constituted of labor, one in living and the other
in dead form.

Capital as

a

whole is comprised of the pro-

ductive and exchange relations (along its vertical axis)
of living to objectified labor
(see Figure 1).

(along its horizontal axis)

Objectified labor, the inverted subject,

increases itself at the expense of living labor in the

production sphere, and buys new living labor capacity in
the sphere of exchange.

Oddly enough, the subject/object

structure of capital, while dominating the text of the

Grundrisse
tal.

,

seems almost absent from the pages of Capi-

Here Marx probes in detail the division of capital

.
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into surface and depth, but speaks of the alienated
and

inverted relation between subject and object only on isolated occasions.

This motif nonetheless is suppressed

rather than missing from the later work.

It underpins

the theory of capital's domination of wage labor and the

laws of capital accumulation.

It also is the key to the

dynamic of capital's development and demise.
Early in his writings, Marx praises Hegel for

identifying the "dialectic of negativity" as the "moving

..,,,101^
4-andq creating
principle"
of every social order.

Marx

too looks to an internal dynamic rather than to external

causes in order to explain social transformation.

But

unlike Hegel, Marx cannot found this dynamic in the de-

velopment of an abstract Idea and its manifestation as a
series of national spirits.

He must attribute to some

facet of human practice alone, the tension which gives

way to new forms of social life.

His ambivalence in

choosing the precise terms in which to explain transfor-

mation bespeaks what will become, as we have seen,

a per-

sistent dilemma: is the development and particularly the
collapse of a social order to be attributed to the agency
of its human authors and actors, or to an objective logic

beyond their knowledge and control?
Marx chooses the first path.

In The Holy Family

,

He explains the impulse of

"private property" towards its dissolution almost en-
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tirely by reference to the proletariat's coming to class

consciousness and becoming a revolutionary agent.

Simply

and precisely because it recognizes its own power lessness

and debasement, the proletariat is driven to destroy the

whole world of private property.
The Poverty of Philosophy

,

In The German Ideology

and The Communist Manifesto

,

,

Marx similarly describes the whole of bourgeois production as internally divided into antagonistic bourgeoisie
and proletariat, and he again points to the emergence of
a class conscious proletariat as the agent of the demise

of the bourgeois order.

He is newly careful, however, to

stipulate the material conditions under which revolutionary consciousness occurs.

These conditions, to which the

objective development of capital itself gives birth, include the concentration of formerly isolated workers on
one place, the increasing numbers of property less la-

borers, their mounting insecurity and impoverishment,
the equalization of their interests as capital breaks
in
down separate skills into repetitive tasks, the growth

communications, etc.

The workers'

struggle to protect

to
their common interests, which begins as a struggle
when
maintain wages, becomes political and revolutionary

members of an opthey come to understand themselves as

emancipating itpressed class, whose true interest is in
relations.
self from the world of capitalist
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In the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx continues to

see capital as generating internal contradictions which

finally undermine it.

The conditions of capitalist pro-

duction are "engaged in suspending themselves and hence in

positing the historic pre-suppositions for a new state of
society."

102

But while he retains his dialectical view

of capital as self -negating

10 3
,

he makes a tremendous

theoretical advance over his earlier work.

He discovers

an objective logic by which he can account for both capi-

tal's development and breakdown, so that his pronounce-

ment of this breakdown no longer dependent upon the simple

assertion that the proletariat will become a revolutionary class.

While the early Marx argued that capital ne-

gates itself by creating
its antithesis,

a

class-conscious proletariat as

the mature Marx shows how capital col-

lapses through objective contradictions which congeal

around its horizontal structure but reveal themselves

through its vertical structure.

In an unintended conse-

quence of its drive to reduce necessary and increase surplus labor, capital increases the proportion of fixed
capital, which does not create new value, to living labor,

which does.

The magnification of the objective conditions

results
of production at the expense of the subjective,
of use values
in the production of ever greater quantities

labor, a riswith ever less direct expenditure of human
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ing proportion of surplus to necessary labor but a falling rate of profit; deepening crises of over-production

and consequently crises in circulation; and more severe

interruptions in the production of necessary as well as
surplus value.
Thus in his mature works, Marx looks first of all

not to the intentional action of the working class, but
to the objective requirements of capital, in order to

explain the evolution and breakdown of the capitalist
mode of production.

Because he understands capital to be

the inverted subject of the productive process, his con-

cern with the way it dominates and determines that process is not surprising.

But he comes up against a seri-

ous dilemma when he wants to introduce the revolutionary

working-class into his mature theory--and this introduction is, after all, the point of his long intellectual
and political labors.

His method of explaining capital

in terms of an objective logic provides no grounding for

the emergence of human agency inside the bounds of bour-

geois society.

Nor does it follow, that because the lo-

gic of capital entails its own mystification, the collaps(
of capital will bring with it a rational break-through in
the self-understanding of an oppressed class.

In truth,

Marx's explanatory method simply cannot accommodate the

possibility of human agency, whether it be revolutionary
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or not.

This is why he is forced to push off the moment

of class struggle until the final pages of Capital.

And

here, it is only through some strange cartesian synchrony

with capital's internal crises and decline, that

a

pro-

letariat emerges which understands its exploitation and
acts in accordance with its own, lucid reason.

At this

point, Marx simply discards his structural analysis and

explains the communist revolution by sole reference to
the purposes of its participants.

CHAPTER

V

SCIENCE, HISTORY, AND THE EXPLANATION
OF HUMAN ACTION

One of the most vivid images in Marx's social

theory, is the deep conceptual divide between action de-

termined by objective social forces, and action determined
by the agency of its human authors.

This divide informs

Marx's vision of an historical juncture between alienated
and unalienated labor; his distinction between mystified

and transparent social relations; and the break between
his explanation of present social life in terms of an sb-

stract logic, and future social life in terms of the purposes of its participants.

His frankly dualistic under-

standing of action gives Marx

a

cutting edge with which to

critique the system of capital.
three theoretical contradictions.

It also forces him into

First, as a materialist,

he vehemently denies that history has its own ideas, aims,

or

Yet he reads into the passage of time a begin-

ends."'"'^'^

ning and

a

middle--in which an original subject-object

unity is supplanted by an epoch of alienated and inverted

subject-object relations

— and

an end, or "real beginning"

producin which the laboring subject freely controls the
tive process.

Second, as a rationalist, he firmly be185
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lieves that human beings one day will
determine, with complete lucidity, their own social relations.
Yet he denies
any locus or historical precedent for
rational agency when
he describes past thought as ideological
and past action
as mystified.

Finally, as an antagonist of capital, he is

deeply committed to the making of
class.

a

revolutionary working

Yet his method of explaining the capital-wage la-

bor relation in terms of an objective dynamic undercuts
not the mere factual, but the logical basis for class con-

scious, revolutionary action.

Ironically, Marx could resolve these contradictions
if he were to make a small but vital shift in his under-

standing of human action: if he

were to collapse what he

sees as two temporally distinct forms of action into two

analytically internal moments of action.

On the one side

of the collapse, this would mean that every action, re-

gardless of the particular context or epoch in which it
occurs, entails the possibility that it become relatively

transparent to its particular author as well as to other
actors.

Within any given act, then, the actor can become

more aware than she had been before, of the specific social
roots of her purposes and the larger social drama to which
her action contributes.

In consequence,

it is never a

closed case that an action is explicable entirely in terms
of an objective logic of practice.

To the extent that the
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actor becomes relatively self-conscious, she is
not simply
a bearer of purposes and beliefs determined
elsewhere.

Although the outer shape of her behavior may be the same,
the explanatory status of her intentions is enhanced.

(Typically, however, the newly self-reflective actor will
be under internal pressure either to behave differently
as well, or to repress or distort what she has learned

about herself.)

On the other side of the collapse, every

action, regardless of its social and historical milieu,

entails the possibility that it become relatively opaque
to its own particular author and to other actors.

The

actor always is in danger--although conservatives would

refute the fact that it is

a

danger

— of

losing sight of

some aspect of what she is doing and why she is doing it.
In consequence,

internal to every action is the possibil-

ity that it cannot be explained entirely in terms of the

socially
thor.

constituted

intentions and purposes of its au-

To the extent that she does not comprehend the real

sources and impact of her action, that action, although

intentional, will be governed by a larger objective logic
of social practice of which she is unaware.
If we conceptualize action itself as internally

contradictory and multi- layered

— as

always, in shifting

proportions, relatively transparent and relatively opaque,
of
and as always, to shifting degrees, explicable in terms
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intersubjective meanings and purposes and explicable
in
terms of an objective logic of social practice—
we can

extricate Marx's theory from some of its stubborn and

troublesome dilemmas.

First, Marx no longer would be

forced to read history as moving towards
of freedom and rationality,

a

final climax

in order to insure a place

in his theory for human agency.

Conversely, in dismant-

ling what can only be described as an historical plot,
he would be free to re-construct the sorely inadequate no-

tion (which he himself discards when he discusses real

historical events) of past action as fully mystified and
future action as fully transparent.

That past as well as

future action includes the possibilities for its own relative transparency, creates an opening through which one

can begin to glimpse the immensely various and subtle ways
in which action can conflict or mesh with (for it is not

inevitable that the self-conscious actor will be
lious one) a given social order.

a

rebel-

That future as well as

past action includes the possibilities for its own opacity,
rules out a description of consciousness under communism
as statically and abstractly rational.

Persons think with-

in a conceptual framework rooted in a particular, limited

mode of life, and this is as true in communism as in capitalism.

The development of self-consciousness on the part

of the individual actor hence always will be a relative
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one, defined against and partially constrained by
an in-

herited mode of thought and practice.

Furthermore, self-

consciousness will always be a precarious possession, in
that the new social antagonisms which are bound to emerge
in any dynamic order, will give rise to new reasons for

opacity in social relations, and new standards of and

barriers to rational action.

There is, as well, another

sense in which self -consciousness must be always partial.

Even in a society which has little need to mystify its own
relations, each person will act somewhat in the dark of
the actions of others, for two reasons.

First, the actor

who pursues her own affairs is plunged at once into a
complex of events authored by many others besides herself, so that she never can be certain of what the conse-

quences of her actions will be.

That immediate complex of

events, in turn, is underwritten by a dense web of practices whose strands extend far beyond the limits of the

actor's vision, so that she can be less certain still of

what larger pattern she is helping to create.

Thus, the

very sociality of practice ensures that the actor can
have only an imperfect knowledge of what she is doing, at

least while she is doing it.

Second, in her relations

with others, the actor continuously must face the dilemma
of how to disclose herself.

This dilemma too, which she

experiences in terms of her specific situation, nonethe-
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less is inherent in the social nature of
action.

And

every resolution of what to conceal and
what to reveal of
herself, of what to put in and leave out of
her speech and
her movements, entails that she appears only
guardedly to
otheres, who do not witness what was not said or
done

after all.

Each person, then, can have only an imperfect

knowledge of the reasons why others act as they do.

This

is true when those others are intimate friends as well
as

when they are strangers.
This inescapable opacity of social life is the

source of much of its frustration and some of its tragedy.
It is also the source of two of its greatest pleasures:

the pleasure of acting in the knowledge that one cannot

know exactly what will come afterwards; and the pleasure
of discovering hidden layers and facets of persons already
in ones acquaintance.

The special horror of the idea of

living a fully predictable life in the company of fully

transparent human beings, is the horror of acting without
the possibility of adventure, and of knowing without the

possibility of surprise.
The fact that action is always internally complex

and contradictory, casts a shadow on the rationality of

revolution.

Those who rebel may have

a

clear understanding

of the social relations they are rebelling against, and in

this respect we would want to describe their action as ra-
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tional.

But at the same time, and with a special
ven-

geance, new barriers arise to their knowing
fully what they
are doing.
First and most startling, revolution puts an

end to the tacit rules, well-worn habits and
routines

which lend a minimal predictability to social life.

Al-

though a new set of rules and mores may begin to replace
the old long before open conflict occurs,

it still is the

case that people no longer can rely on other people to
act in familiar sorts of ways, for familiar sorts of reasons.

Nor can they trust that their own desires, needs

and aims will remain the same comfortable sorts that they

had been, once everything else has changed.

Far less than

usual, then, can they be sure of the full meaning, conse-

quences and larger implications of their own action.

The

profound uncertainty which thus pervades human action during great upheavals, is both the source of the real pro-

mise of revolution, and the strongest argument which pro-

ponents of conservatism have in their favor.

Second, and

paradoxically, revolutionaries who seek to destroy the
past, still think and act in ways which are thoroughly

bound up with it.

This is inevitable and necessary, given

the fact that neither thought nor action can occur in ab-

straction from an already existent mode of life.
those defining themselves against

a

But

given order of things,

tend to be especially blind to how they are captive of it.
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Hence they often believe that they are
acting according to
the dictates of an abstract reason.
Lastly, in times of
revolution, the problem of self-disclosure
becomes especially acute.
On the one hand, the pressures of conflict
force actors to be explicit about their interests
and al-

legiances, and the collapse of traditional mores allows

them to express with spontaneity, new ideas, dreams and
desires.

But on the other hand, the very absence of fa-

miliarity and predictability in social relations, and
the high stakes which every decision entails, means that

actors must learn to be very cautious of how they reveal

themselves through their actions to others.

This lesson

can be a harsh and sometimes brutal one.
The eventual emergence of new rules, conventions
and stable patterns of interaction, puts an end to such

severe uncertainty in social relations.

However, the con-

tradictions which must develop within any social whole,
and the inescapable element of opacity in every action,

always may induce a new break between the self-

understanding of participants and the reality of their
practice.

History, in sum, is neither punctuated by tri-

umphs of pure reason in revolution, nor concludes in an
age of perfect rationality and freedom.

This does not

mean, of course, that history might not be progressive in
the non-teleological sense of the term.

Hegel saw it as
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progressive in this sense

(as well as in the other)

when

he argued that each new age inherits an increasingly rich

and elaborated past.

Marx does the same.

While Hegel em-

phasized the accretions which the simple passage of time
adds to art, religion and philosophy, Marx focuses on the

historical development
cial relations. 105
in,

of knowledge about natural and so-

He argues that this development issues

among other things, an ever more advanced productive

technology and an ever more complex social organization
of production, which ultimately will provide the material

pre-conditions for the end of economic exploitation.

In

strongly anti- teleological statements which belie his own
theory of history, he claims that such pre-conditions

emerge not because the actions of previous generations

"providentially" prepared the way for

a

future of freedom

and equality, but because "the successive generations

transformed the results acquired by the generations that
preceded them.""*"^^

How a generation transforms what it

acquires, one must emphasize, is an open question.

For,

unfortunately, the historical progress of knowledge does
not secure the progress of any other social good.
What, then, are the implications of an internally

complex concept of action for Marx's scientific method?
Certainly, his two most fundamental caveats still hold.
social pracTo understand society, one must examine real
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tice, including the meaninqs which inform it.

One also

must abstract from the intricate texture of real
practice
to the clarity of its internal structure.

But the fact

that any action may become for its author and other actors, relatively transparent or relatively opaque, in-

validates an explanation of a form of life either solely
in terms of a self-mystifying inner logic, or solely in

terms of the reason of its participants (or, to put it

structurally, in terms of a logic of practice they wholly

determine and understand)

.

An account of any society must

proceed on both the level of intersub jective meanings and
the level of inner structure.

The disparity between, say,

capitalism and communism, will not be reflected in the
use of two disparate explanatory methods, but rather in

different sets of intersub jective meanings and structures
of social practice; different degrees of "fit" or contra-

diction between the way actors understand their practice
and its objective structure; and different sources of

whatever opacity obtains in social relations.

It must be

stressed that because actors never fully and finally comprehend, or fully and finally mis-understand, their own
practice, there can never be full correspondence or com-

plete contradiction between an interpretive and structural

account of any social whole.

In sum, differences in the

status of intentionality from one society to the next
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always will be differences of degree.

The Marxist tradition has had great faith in the

powers of a materialist science.
like to draw attention to

materialist science is

a

a

few of its limits.

I

would

First,

privileged form of knowledge vis

a vis ordinary understanding,

to the extent that it probes

the hidden depths of social life.

privileged.

In conclusion,

But it is not completely

We have seen why this is so.

Science must

explain society partly in terms of the meanings and beliefs
of its participants, and it is always possible that these

participants will come to
they are doing.

a

newly acute awareness of what

Social science, then, may be uniquely ri-

gorous and systematic, but it is not an entirely separate

enterprise from everyday self -reflection

.

Second, while a

materialist science may penetrate the reality of past and
present, and may identify the pressures towards dissolution in a given mode of life, it cannot predict the course
of the future.

It cannot do so on the basis of a know-

ledge of universal laws of human behavior, because it

claims that human beings are inherently innovative in their

thought and practices.

It cannot do so on the basis of a

knowledge of an historical purpose, plot or idea, because
be preit claims that categories of consciousness cannot

dicated of abstractions like "history."

Instead, a con-

—
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sistent materialist theory must conceive of
action as,
within concrete limitations, open-ended.
That is, it

must conceive of the consequences of action as
not determined in advance of action itself. Third, in that
action
is open-ended,

the decisions one makes about what to do

in a particular political situation,

which one engages in or against

a

the intentions with

particular set of poli-

tical practices, and those practices themselves, may be

thoughtful of unthinking, scrupulous or devious, revolutionary or reactionary.
scientific.

They cannot be scientific or un-

We have seen that it is impossible, outside

of an idealist or positivist framework, to speak intel-

ligibly of an "inevitable" socialist future.

similar conceptual mistake to speak of

a

It is a

"scientific"

communist movement or a "scientific" socialism.

If one

abandons first the notion that human action expresses an
inherent reason in history, and second the notion that

politics is a field of law-governed human behavior, one
cannot use the categories of "scientific" and "unscientific" with respect to political action at all.

With the

obvious exception of theoretical practice itself, such

categories are germaine not to the taking of political
action but rather to the understanding of it.
and here he departs from Hegel

— Marx

Of course

firmly believes that

scientific understanding need not come too late to enhance
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the self-knowledge of political actors.

But although

persons may act differently once they grasp the full reality of their social life, they act no more scientifically
than they did before.

They also may act no more justly

than they did before--not, however, because we cannot speak

intelligibly of politics in this way, but because clear vision does not guarantee just practice.

.

.
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Enlightenment mentality would apply to Marx's mentality as
^Cf.

we 1 1

^Karl Marx, Grundrisse
1973)

,

p.

265.

-"^Ibid.,

p.

458.

198

(New York: Vintage Books,
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706.

p.

,
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See Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (New York
International Publishers, 1967), pp. 177-8, 180. All
references to Capital refer to Volume 1.
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Capital
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Capital
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p.
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310.

p.

p.

,

831.

737.

p.
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See also pp.

10.

Grundrisse
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]

Ibid., p.

152.
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Insofar as the individual especially in the stage
of early capital is "personified capital, it is not values
in use and the enjoyment of them, but exchange value and
its augmentation, that spin him into action. ... So far,
therefore, as his actions are a mere function of capital
endowed as capital is, in his person, with consciousness
and a will--his own private consumption is a robbery per."
Ibid., p. 592.
petrated on accumulation
.

20

Grundrisse

,

p.

.

238.

2

So that the capitalist "again and again appropriates without equivalent, a portion of the previously
materialized labour of others, and exchanges it for a
greater quantity of living labour." Capital p. 583.
,
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Grundrisse

,

Grundrisse

^^Ibid.
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463.

831-2.

^^Ibid., pp.
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^^I have made no special note in the text of those
I assume
works on which Engels collaborated with Marx.
signed his
he
which
that Marx did not disagree with that to
corEngels
with
name, and in fact the arguments he makes
own.
his
respond with many of those he makes on

Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy
of course,
Family, in MECW, Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 124-134; and
Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach."
"^^See Karl
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world order but only
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to carry out ideas men are needed who can exert a prac-

tical force
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The German Ideology
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p.

6.

Ibid.
39

"Religious alienation as such occurs only in the
sphere of consciousness in the inner life of man, but
econimic alienation is that of real life and its supersession, therefore, affects both aspects." Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts p. 156.
,

,

40

The German Ideology

,

p.

2.

Here Marx is making the different
point that consciousness and self-consciousness are social
products arising from the need of human beings for social
^"'"Ibid.

,

p.

19.

intercourse
discussion of the internal connection between reason and emotion, see Alasdair Maclntyre, "Reason
as the Servant of the Passions," paper prepared for Conference on Political Thought, 1972.
"^^For a

"^^After noting reproduction as a basic material
practice in the narrow sense of the term, Marx focuses
exclusively on the material practice of production as the
ultimate determinant of social life. The problems with
Howhis silence on reproductive relations are legion.
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ever, I will follow his usage of the term "material practice" in its second, narrow sense, to refer to productive
practices alone.
44

The German Ideology

p.

,

18.

45

Scattered throughout the texts of The German
Ideology The Poverty of Philosop hy The Communist Mani festo and the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy are a few odd phrases undeniably
mechanistic. But far more characteristic are passages
which are highly ambiguous about the relation between
thought and material practice.
His duscussion of the
"moments" of the life-process is a prime example: by distinguishing the moment of consciousness from those of material production, the production of new needs, reproduction and social cooperation, he seems to imply an external relation between thought and material practice; by
calling consciousness the "fifth moment" of the lifeprocess, whose development is intimately tied to the other
moments, he seems to imply an internal connection. See
also, for example, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels The
The Marx Communist Manifesto in Robert C. Tucker, ed
Engels Reader (New York: W.VJ. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972),
,

,

,

,

,

.

,
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,

351.
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The German Ideology
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13.

^^Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Cri tique of Political Economy in Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers,
,

1969)

,

p.

182.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

182.

"^^Certain passages in particular show how Marx gets
himself into a very tight corner on the question of the
base/superstructure relation. To counter the claims of
German idealism, he had to be absolutely adamant that abstract ideas and principles do not have logical or ontological priority over real human practice, and furtherprithat material productive practice has an explanatory this
But in being adamant
macy over all other kinds.
^^c., simply
way, he comes close to viewing politics, art,
practices with their
as sets of ideas, rather than as real
for a
own (if limited) explanatory power in accounting
edge
the
on
stand
here
Marx
Not only does
social whole.
he comes close to
of a reductionist social analysis, but
make: that
subverting exactly the point he is trying to

m

1
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^^"^^^ practice, political and
itTilttr^ laeas
^^ITJ^included.
"TTT^
artistic
His dilemma is evident in his statement
that:
Morality, religion, metaphysics
have no history, no
development; but men, developing their material
intercourse,
^^^^^ ^^^1 existence, their thinking
li^^lu
"^l^^ of
V^^^
and
the products
their thinking.
Life is not
mined by consciousness, but consciousness by life deter"
The
German Ideology, p. 14-15.
It is evident in his critT^e
of Proudhon, who explained historical epochs in
terms of
emergent principles like equality and property, as
though "it was the principle that made history, and not
history that made the principle." For "When we ask ourselves why a particular principle was manifested in the
11th or in the 18th century rather than in any other, we
are necessarily forced to examine minutely what men were
like in the 11th century, what they were like in the 19th,
what were their respective needs, their productive forces,
their mode of production, the raw materials of productionin short, what were the relations between man and man which
resulted from all these conditions of existence. To get
to the bottom of all these questions-what is this but to
draw up the real, profane history of men in every century
and to present these men as both the authors and actors of
their own drama?" The Poverty of Philosophy MECW p. 170.
Finally, it is evident in his description of the materialist method, where he states that from the material production of life and form of social intercourse connected with
it, one is to explain "the whole mass of different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion,
philosophy, ethics, etc., etc., and trace their origins and
grov;th, by which means, of course, the whole thing can be
shown in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciproIt has
cal action of these various sides on one another.)
not, like the idealist view of history, in every period to
look for a category, but remains constantly on the real
ground of history; it does not explain practice from the
idea but explains the formation of ideas from material
and concludes that all forms and products
practice
of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism
but only by the practical overthrow of the actual
social relations ..." The German Ideology pp. 28-9.
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

,

50

5

The Communist Manifesto

The German Ideology

^^Karl Marx, C apital
Second Edition, p. 19.
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53^

Economic and Philosophica l Manuscripts

54

The German Ideolocrv
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p.

,

142.

14.

p.

55

Marx's ironic description of the "method of
Ideology:" 1) Ruling ideas are separated from
ruling relationships founded in a given mode of production;
abstract Ideas appear to rule history; 3) "the Idea"2) is
abstracted from these various ideas as the dominant force
in
history, and all separate ideas are seen as "'forms of selfdetermination' on the part of the concept developing itself in history;" a) lastly, "To remove the mystical appearance of this 'self-determining concept' it is changed
into a person
'self-consciousness'
or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the 'concept' in history
the 'philosophers,'
the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history ..." The German Ideology pp. 42-43.
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For example, see Marx's Preface to A Contribu tion to the Critique of Political Economy
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Holy Family, pp. 109 -110.
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The Communist Manifesto, p.
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Preface to English Edition of Capital
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Capital, p. 569.
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The concept of the commodity functions differently in the Grundrisse and Capital
The Grundrisse charts
the journey during which Marx discovers the full significance of the commodity form.
He then uses the commodity
through which
as the central organizing concept of Capital
he exposes to his reader the complex reality of the capitalwage labor relation.
.
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101-2.

278.

96

Marx's prefaces and afterwords to Capital can be
very misleading.
In them, he tends to represent his method
in naturalistic terms and, correspondingly, social development in biologistic terms. These meta-theoretical statements, however, bear no resemblance to his actual analyses
of capital, social life, and history.
One must not, in
this instance, take his beliefs about what he was doing as
a correct account of what he in fact did.
See, for example,
his Preface to the First German Edition of Capital Vol. 1,
and his curious Afterword to the Second German Edition of
Capital Vol. 1, where he equates the dialectical method
(in its "non-mystified" form) with the mode of analysis of
It is not that some parallels cannot be
natural evolution.
drawn between a biological and social dialectic. But the
differences between them are critical, especially for a
theorist who emphasizes the significance in social life of
mystification, class-consciousness, self-expression, and
rationality
,

,

97
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Capital

,

,

p.

p.

36.

p.

539.

lO^See his chapters on simple reproduction, the
conversion of surplus value to capital, capitalist manufacture and industry.
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461.

^Although, Marx reminds us, new modes of social
antithesis
productive practice always develop out of and in seltof the
to existing modes and not "from the womb
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positing Idea."
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^Q^ The German Ideology p. 38; The Holy Fa mily, p.
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